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t. THE STRATEGIC ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE: REJECTING THE MYOPIC 
ECONOMICS OFTHE LEGALIZED GAMBLING PROPONENTS 
The fundamental question regarding legalized gambling activities is 
whether gambling activities help or hinder the economy. Gambling affects local, 
state, interstate, and nat ional economies. 1 This Arlkle ex trapolates downward 
from national and interstate economic fac tors to the state economies and 
demonstrates how the st rategic elements of ga mbling nct ivit ies impact state and 
local economies.2 Gambling organizations traditionally focus their attention on 
local economies or specia lized factors in those local economies or both. This 
narrow focus usually gives a di slorled view of selected positives that the gam-
bling activities allegedly bring to the local community. 
• Professor. University of Illinois at Urbana·Champ<lign. B.A.. The College of William 
& Mary. 1972; ID., University of Georgia. 1976; M.B.A ., Universi ty of Georgia, 1977; L.L.M .. 
University of Virginia, 1978; SJ.D., University of Virginia, 1981. 
1. InlernlUional economies and nalional economies other than the United States economy 
are beyond the scope of this analysis. For the clnssic work on economic theory, sec AOAM SMITH, 
THE WEALTH OF NATIONS ( 1937). 
2. For general discussions of the interface between public poliey and l."Conomics. see 
J OH:>/G.CROSS, A THEORY OF ADAPTIVE ECONOMIC BEHM' tOR (1983). 
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A common example of a selected positive is the projected tax revenues the 
gambling organizat ions present to the local governments. These revenue projec-
tions are commonly over-estimaled to persuade local government officials to 
allow the gambling interests into their community,3 In some instances, the pro-
jected tax revenues do not materialize al all.4 giving rise to the allegation that the 
legalized gambling organizations sometimes give their projections in bad faith.~ 
3. Su, ~.g., BElTER GoV'T AsS'N. STAFF WHITE PAP1;R: CASINO GAMBLING IN CHICAGO 
70-75 (1992) (hereinafter BCTTER GOV'T ASS'N]. This impressive report basically destroys the 
arguments of the proponents of the 1992 plan for a $2 billion casillO complex in Chicago. 
Gaming operations may experience seasonal slumps. as was the case in the riverboat commu-
nity of Jo Davieu County. Illinois. "10 Daviess County received $164.157 in November [1992]. 
down $75,825 from October's $239.982. That's a 32 percent drop in county money." Finn Bullers. 
Eagle B<xm/ings Oro,) 41%, TELEGRAPH HERALD (Dubuque, Iowa). Dec. 10, 1992, at A3. 
Approximately one year after beginning openlfions, two out of Iowa's live riverboats left Iowa 
for Biloxi. Mississippi. 
In eastern Iowa communities that had placed large bets on riverboat gam-
bling to develop tOIJnsm and to make thei r cities more aUractive to industry, 
some offiCIals said that they were flabbergasted and that Ihey felt betrayed by 
[the steamboat company). 
Fen Madison had spent $2.2 million on riverfront improvements and resi-
dents WIll be paying off the debt over the next 15 years. '" think people in lown 
will definilely feel betrayed," City Manager John Pick said. 
William Petroski & Ken Fuson, Boals uuving; B('t Limit Cjt~, DES MOtNES REG., May 28, 1991, 
at AI, s('(' Thomas Fogany, Steamboat Move Stwu La~rs, DES MOlNES REG., May 28, 1992. 
at AI. 
In Quincy, Illinoi s. the company promoting an off- track belting parlor (OTB) projected 1992 
lax revenues of S200,OClO, bUllhe actual tax revenues for the first eight months approximated only 
$25,000 each to the City of Quincy and to Adams County in which Quincy was located. John 
Webber, OTB Rel'enul!s Falling Short o/Expectations, Q UINCY HERALD-WHtG ( Ill .), Jan. IS, 1993, 
at A 1. On a 12·monlh basis. these amounts constituted only 37% of the "promised" tax revenues. 
Id. 
Once the gambling interests arc "voted" into a local community, their common tactic is to ask 
for and gel Ill.'( waivers. Sl!e, ('.8., Linda Busche, OrB uaps Nl!w Hurd/#!, DANVlUECOMMEROAL-
NEWS (Ill.), Aug. IS, 1990. at AI; Laura Frank, Stelll! OKs OTB Rebate PIClfI , DANVtUf. 
COMMERCIAL-NEWS (III .). Aug. 16, 1990. at Al (waiving permanent "admission tll.'(~ and granting 
.50% livc-ycar Ill.'( rebate up to $50,(XX) per year from Danville and up to another S5O,OOO per year 
from Vennilion County, Illinois). Allegations were made thallhe lax rebate plan violated Illinois 
statutes. Frank, SUI,ra, at AI. 
The request for a five-year tax waiver has become a standard request, and the granting of such 
tax waivers has become almost pro fonna. Suo e.g., Letter from William H. 11mnnan, President. 
Inter-Track Partners, 10 Mayor's Office, City of Champaign, Illinois (May 31, 1990) (on file with 
City of ChampaIgn. Illinois) (requesting ''that the City pass an ordinance whereby the City would 
I'K)( levy an admission ftaxl charge anytime during the next five years"). 
4. SI!#! INTEU..lGENa;; BUREAU,Iu.. STATEPOI.JcE, How CASINO GAMBUNCi AFFECTS LAW 
EhFORCEMEXT 13 (Apr. 16, 1992) (hereinafter ILL STATE PoLICE). 
5. Sl!e supra note 3 and accompanying taL 
·~ ~L ~{; 
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Ilit ' '; . Xi. In a 1-992-pcoposal for a $.2,bHHon-casmo.IO.ompte.x in Chicago, fllinoi3, the '; : ,:"tl,lte'ged or projected tax ~~mles. w~J'e})~(w~n'$327 ".Jil.'ion6 and $500 ,miUion.1 l',: >:t'dnd even up to a more unbkely 5625 rmlhQn to $644 mIUJ()n.s I " " This projection of $625 million was,4isseminaled in wbat:3ppears to be an 
.Jit","uno;tted (but proboNy,he FaU<>f 1992) -press release blHhe spomOfS of ,h. 
, -<,~SHtO complex.~~.As 'Of June 11, 1992. the U1U)ol$ pres.s was reportiA-g the S625 
.~ .': million figure,lO The news release was interesting in thtlt it claimed: ' 
. ", . f An ecooomic impact study conducted by Anhur Andersen & Co. concludes 
I,; - the proposed-entertainment and casino .complex wiU create up to 100.000 '., . new jobs-37.<JOO during construction and 66.000 permanent jobs 00 and _ ',. off~site-a.nd produce at least $625 million in new lax revenues. The .study 10;;" • further predicl!I the center will draw 1(}.2 milliOn new tour~slS to Chicago 
.,.. h " 
." .. , cae year .... 
l~ ~~" These statements by the sponsors of the casino complex should be com-
.ii.' pared with their intemai publie relations documents" dated April 16, 1992.12 ?i. .' 'ifhcse document! urged"the sponsors of the casino complex to: 
<'16, . 
~ I;}. I :' 
.~ ~' 
{b}e proactIve OR "ta,x"t'revenue" issues: It probably won't be enough for 
Arthur Andersen and,Nonhwcsteni University [0 develop numbers dull are 
"credib~·'. a~hOtlgh thM'iS lhe e!isenttal ftrSf step to take. 
We ffil,tSt also use these studies to make a compelling aoo convincing 
oase for tbe kind of jobs that win be created, with an emphasis on their 











6. EditOrial, EcOl1omicalJy, Casil10s af~ a GO()d Bet, an TRIs .• May 24. 1992. § 4, at 2 
[hcrcinartcr Carinos an a Good B"j. 
7. Edimrial. Dolt!y. Dt!v~l~rs Rais~ ,1w Sullen. CHI. TRIS., Mar. 26. 1992. § I, at 28 
(bettillaftcr lkvelop"s Raiu ,hi! Slaw). 
8. In the report sponsored by the proponents. of lhe casino complex. lIle numben have 10 
be viewed very favorably for the rotal, to n:ac:h $SOO million. S~~ CHICAGO GAMING Co!.tM 'N. 
EcoNOMIC AND OTHER IMPACTS Of A PROPOSED GAM1NC, ENT£RTAINM£NT AND HOT£L FAQLrrY 
27()"7 1 (May 19, 1992) (prepared by Deloine & TGUche, Chicaao . III. ) [hereinafter PROPOSED 
OAMlNO]. The $6'25 million to $644 million in: estlm:tted tax revenue& resulted f((lm .several pre-
dieriom; in a report by Arthur Andersen and Company, which was sponS<lred by Ihe prGpOOents of 
the casino complex.. Ray Long, New Casino Sludlu Bolster Pr~dic,ioru of Rig POI for City. CHI. 
SjJN·1'I.ME&. May 20, 1992, at I , 16. Su 8~nerally. ARTHUR ANDEItSEN & Co .• IMPACT OF THE 
P1t0l'0SED CUCAGO I/'fTERNATIONAL ENTERTAINMENTCENl"ER (1992). 
9. News R.e!ease from Chicago Inlenlatiooal Entertainment Cel\lcr, Chicago, II I., News at 
a Glance I (undated news release, probably Fall of (992) (on file wilh Drake Law Review) 
Iheremafter News at. a Giancel. 
10 . Su, ~.g .• John Webber, Chicago Gambling Plan Would Hurt DoWI1S1a/~: E,xperf, 
QuiNCY HHRAlD-WHl(; (lit). June 11 . 1992, at 1,3 (reponing the complex. would ~[rJajse more 
than $625 mil lion jn city, county and lax revenue annually after the complex opens"). 
II. NcwsataGlance • .Jupranote9,at I. 
12. BETTER Gov'T ASS'N. supra notc 3. app. P, 
13. /d. tlpp. p. at 10. 
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A comparison of these documents reflected poorly upon the sponsors of the 
casino complex and led to allegations that cred ible sources were being 
"manipulated" by the sponsors. 14 
With regard to the issue of jobs, the initial estimates promulgated by the 
sponsors of the casino complex were reported on March 26. 1992. as 10,000 
construction jobs and 20.000 permanent jobs, IS As one financial commentator in 
Chicago observed: 
Ten thousand ... construction jobs are supposed to be created by this 
project. This may very well be true. However. we could create plenty of 
construction (and pennanent) jobs by building brothels and opium dens. If 
job crealion is the aim of local government, why hasn't the mayor proposed 
such a project?16 
By May 24. 1992, the estimated "new jobs" had grown to 38,10017 (that is, 
for the year 2001 ).18 As criticism of the casino complex increased, the sponsors 
of the project continued to increase the "jobs ante" from 15,000 to 36,000 to 
66,000 jobS. 19 By November IS, 1992, during the fall legislative session in 
Illinois, the so-called "Coalition for Jobs," apparently associated with the casino 
sponsors, had raised the estimates to 90,000 jobs. 20 Under the aura of credibility 
provided by referencing a professor at Northwestern University and Arthur 
Andersen and Company,21 the jobs estimate then rose to 100,000 new jobs.22 
Therefore, during approximately an eight-month time frame, job estimates ranged 
from 15,000 to IOO.OOO---raising serious doubt about the credibility of the spon-
sors of the casino complex. It should be noted that the entire state economy 
would probably have lost more jobs than the sponsors of the casino complex 
promised to credle-partially due to the migralion of consumer dollars away 
from the pre-existing Illinois businesses. as concluded by the Illinois governor's 
office.23 
14. Compare News at a Glance, supra note 9, at I. with BETTER GOV'T ASS'N, S!lpro note 
3, app. P, at 10. See getlua/ly BETTER GoV'T ASS'N, supro note 3, app. O. 
15. DevelofUN Raise Ihe Slakes, supra note 7, at 28; see also Long, supra note 8, at 16 
(reporting estimated creation of full-time equivalent employees of either 12,000 pursuant to the 
Proposed Gaming Facility Report or 18,000 pursualll to Ihe report by Arthur Andersen and 
Company). 
16. Mark M. Quinn, Social COsIs of CasitIQ Proposal Are Too High, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Apr. 
4,1992,at 16. 
17. Casillos are a Good Bel. supra nOie 6, at 2. 
18. PROPOSEOGAMtNG, supra note 8, at 14. 
19. BEITER GOV'T ASS'N, supra note 3 {Personal Statement from (he Execmive Director). 
20. Su Newsata Glance,sllpra note 9. at I. 
2 J. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. Press Release, Office of Illinois Governor James Edgar. Governor Warns Land-Based 
Casinos Could Bring Crime Surge as Well as Overall Loss of Jobs and State Revenues. Sept. 29, 
1992. See, e.g., Webber,supra note 10, at 1,3. 
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Chicago's financial commentators highlighted similar points. Proponents 
of the casinos argued that between 15,000 to 45,000 "pennanent" jobs would be 
created nol only in the casinos, but also the areas around the casinos.24 
To the extent that the casinos attract dollars, either from tourists or resi-
dents, which would have been spent in other lowns, some jobs will be 
created in Chicago. However, a large porlion of the money Ihal will be 
spent in the casinos would have been spent elsewhere in Chicago. Those 
"elsewheres" will consequently suffer. having a decidedly negative impact 
on employment in the "elsewheres." The net increase in permanent jobs 
will not be as great as projected. It could conceivably be ncgalivc. 25 
Similarly, the range of new tourists fluctuated from an initial estimate of 
2.9 million new tourists21'> to estimates of "I 0.2 million new tourists to Chicago 
each year."27 It is even more revealing, however, to analyze the wide variations 
in theoretical tax revenues ranging from $327 million28 to $644 million.2'l The 
most widely-reported estimate was $500 million, and therefore, that estimate 
should be analyzed in-depth. 
Generally, proponents of the casino complex used the higher estimates, 
particularly the $500 million figure, but they usually failed to mention that this 
number: (1) was basically a projection for the "tenth year" after the casino com-
plex was initiated;30 (2) included not only "direct" tax revenues, but also counted 
all "induced" and "indirect" tax revenues;3l (3) ranged more precisely between 
$257 million and $371 million instead of between $500 million and $625 mil-
lion;32 and (4) included tax revenues from the categories of corporate income tax 
(between $28 million and $42 million), sales taxes (between $34 million and $48 
million), and withholding taxes (between $26 million and $90 million))3 The 
estimate also included tax revenues from alcohol, automobile rental, franchise, 
fuel, hotel occupancy, licenses, real property transfer, telecommunications, and 
utilities.34 
These miscellaneous tax revenues would purportedly yield between $97 
million and $212 million in the tenth year. 35 The "preferred" projected "gaming 
tax" to be paid by the operators of the casino complex was 7.7% or between $121 
million and $123 million,36 whereas an "alternative" 10% gaming tax was pro-
24. Quinn,supranole 16.at 16. 
25 . Jd. 
26. Casinos are a Good Bet. supra note 6, at 2: see aLso PROPOSED GAMING. supra nOle 8, 
al44-51. 
27. News at a Glance. supra note 9, at I. 
28. See, e.g., Casinos are (l Good Bel. supra note 6, at 2. 
29. See, e.g., Long, supra note 8, at 16; Webher, supra note 10, at I. 
30. PROPOSED GAMING, supra note 8, at 270-71. 





36. Id. at 271. 
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jected to yield between $158 million and $160 million .17 Although most of the 
public probably believed thaI the gaming lalt was represented by the figure of 
$500 million,38 the actual optimistic gaming tax was between $158 million and 
$160 miIlion,3'~ and the actual grand total of all tax.es to be paid was apparently 
somewhere between $257 million and $370 million.40 The most important aspect 
of the tax issue. however. was stated by the Better Government Association of 
Ch icago: "Why merely 10%7""'1 By comparison, there were serious suggestions 
in Colorado to raise its tax nile (040%,-42 and during 1992 and 1993, stale repre-
sentatives in South Dakota suggested a lax rate of 50%,43 
In the 1992 Chicago scenario, the public began to recogni ze the strategic 
economic negatives associated with casino gambling."" The proponents of the 
casino complex alleged: 
more jobs, greater tax revenues and a floodtide of affluent tourists. But the 
real ity may be something very different. Casino gambling may threaten the 
very tourist industry Ihe city wants to enhance. create only miserable, low-
paying jobs. and attract the mob-in short, negative results that far OUI-
weigh the hyped economic benefits."s 
Furthermore. nothi ng ensures that gambling operations will continue to 
make money when "market saturation" occurs. Atlantic City, New Jers!l serves 
as an example-in 1990. on ly five of its twelve cas inos reported profits. 
Specifi c gambl ing activities might no t always continue to make money. 
" [A] 1991 report by the Atlantic Coumy Divi sion of Econom ic Development 
states that for the past two years the Atlantic City casino gaming industry'S prof-
itability levels had fallen to less than one percent of gross revenues ."47 
Furthermore, the president of the Casino Association of New Jersey, Thomas 
Carver. has reportedly said. "Atlantic City, a town noted for taking suckers, has 
become the biggest sucker of all."~ "Not only does Atlantic City have a sorry 
record for those concerned about crime. welfare. business decline. home owner-
37. Id. 
38. S~e. e.g .• De'l'elo~rs Raise Ihe Slakes, sUI,ra note 7. at 28. For examples of the public 
relations campaign stratcgics regarding taxes. as conducted by thc sponsors of thc casino complcx. 
see BETTER Gov'T ASS'N. supra nOtc 3, at apps. P. Q. 
39. PROPOSED GAMING, sllpra nme 8, at 271. 
40. Id. 
41. BETTER GOV'T ASS·N. supra note 3. at 2 (Personal Sta tement from the Executive 
Director). 
42. Mtlrj Charl ier. The Payoff; Casino G(Unblin8 Saves 1'Jlr,e Colorado Towfls bUI the 
Price Is High. WALL ST. 1" Sept. 23.1992. at AS. 
43. Chet Brokaw, Don', Bet Yet on Stale LAmery Take Fale, ARGUS LEADER (Sioull: Fails, 
S.D.), Jan. 5, 1993. 3t BI; Terry Waster, Pierson 10 Sponsor School·Aid Bill , ARGUS LEAOfR 
(Sioux Falls. S.D.). Jan. 9. 1993. 3t B2. 
44. Thomas F. Roeser, Chicago Casino Plan Gambles City Fulllre. WALL ST. 1.. Aug. 12. 
1992. at A 10. 
45. 'd. 
46. lu •. STATE PoUCE.. supra nme 4. at 13. 
47. ld. 
48. It/. 
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ship, compulsive gambling or community atmosphere, but it has failed to bring 
economic development."4'1 Obviously, the lack of profit s significantly reduces 
tax revenues. 
Most importantly, gambling interests often use an improper comparison 
with projected tax revenues to extrapolate upward from local communities to 
Slate, interstate. and even national economies. The gambling interests argue the 
alleged positive impact on the local community must also be a positive impact on 
slale, interstate, and national economies. These arguments are usually specious, 
and the impacts are usually negative (even on the local community after a time 
lag)." 
Thus, the perspective is crucial to an accurate analysis of the impact of 
gambling activities on economic, business, social, and governmental issues. 
Focusing on local economies and short·tenn impacts is extremely misleading. 
Hypothetically, if a person walks into a local community and has $1 billion to 
spend, when the person begins spending money, there will be a shorHerm 
appearance of positive economic growth resulting in job creation and new tax 
revenues. These same shorHerm impacts would occur even if the $1 billion was 
spent on illegal activities, such as buying and selling illegal drugs. In the mid· 
term and long·term, however, there would be largely negative impacts on the 
local. state, and interstate economies and on their businesses and governments. 
Admittedly. the local economy would initially appear to benefit, and the tax rev· 
enues gcneratedS1 would look promising to government officials. Importantly, 
local elec ted officials would look to new laX revenues as a solut ion to pre-exist· 
ing governmental problems without having to raise taxes, which could alienate 
the electorate. United States Senator Paul Simon has criticized elected officials 
who look to this chimera to temporarily solve their problems of raising new tax 
reven ues.S2 According to Senator Simon, an article by a respected economics 
professor53 suggested "to me on a more solid base what my instinct tells me: 
Communities and States and the Nation should be careful when they look for 
easy revenue cures that may do more damage than ... [officials) realize."S4 The 
mid-term and long·term "soc ial costs" would have to be borne by state govern· 
ments. Therefore, the states' elected officials would have to shoulder the 
respons ibility of raising taxes to create funds to cover the social·welfare costs 
49. Jd. at 13·14. 
50. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
5!. Even in an environment of illegal activities some money will be spent in traditional 
businesses that generate ta~ revenues from the sale of legitimate goods. After lhe initial influx of 
buying, those same pre-existing businesses would feel the drain of the theoretically negative eco-
nomic multipliers that the $1 billion of illegal activity was generating as a type of ·'reverse pump 
rriming:· The illegal activity in the hypochetieal siphons money from the regu lar business econ· 
omy. Similarly,legalized gambling activities siphon money from the regulili business economy. 
52. 138 CONG o REC. SI87 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 1992) (s tatement of Sen. Simon); s~t! 
Interv1ew with United States Senator Paul Simon, (WMAQ-AM, Chicago. 111. radio broadcast. June 
19, 1992); Simon Urgt!s CaUTion Oil Casino in Chicago. NEws-GAZErTE(Champaign, Ill.), June 21, 
1992, at A4 [hereinafter Simon Urg~s Cauriool. 
53. 138 CONGo Roc. SI87 (daily ed. Jan. 22,1992) (reprinting article of Economies 
Professor Earl Grinols, Unive~ity of lJIinois). 
54. 138 CONGo REC. S187 (daily cd. Jan. 22, 1992) (stalement of Scn. Simon). 
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associated with the illegal (or "legalized") activity.j5 This fact has obviously not 
been lost on Senator Simon;S6 but unlike Senator Simon, poorly-informed gov-
ernment officials have apparently missed the net drain that legalized gambling 
has on overall tax revenues : 
Gambling is not the only kind of business that can remove dollars from a 
local economy. but very few remove proportionally as much money for so 
marginal an increase in public revenue. 
As ... [some voters) have discovered, stale lotteries have nOI been very 
successfu l at raisi ng money. Nationwide, lotteries account for only 3.3 per-
cent of the loull revenue raised by lottery Slates-far below the amount 
raised by sales and income taxes. 
Customers of New York City's off-track parlor wagered $959 million 
last year, but after paying all its bills, the corporation had only $33 million 
left over for the city. This year LI992] thc figure will be millions lower. 
according to Fortune magazine. Within a decade, some experts believe Ihm 
the New York operation will be in the red- meaning the city would have to 
sUPlX>n it. That's an ominous sign for ... taxpayers. 
Given the widespread evidence that gambling huns a community, what 
rationale is there for government to act as a conduit for the profits of private 
promoters? 
The answer is none. But naive public officials, like addicted railbirds. 
remained convinced that some day they'll hit the jackpot. It's a delusion as 
old as gambling itsclf. ~1 
Thus, the maneuver of shifting costs and "passing the buck" is seductive to local 
elected officials. but this maneuver is poor public policy and is in reality unethi· 
cal legerdemain. 
It is essential to note that the $1 billion that is being hypothetically spent on 
illegal drug activities also constitutes money that is not being spent in pre..-exist· 
ing traditional businesses. There are also differences between the hypothetical 
spending of SI billion for buying and selling illegal drugs and the hypothetical 
spending of $1 billion by legalized gambling activilies. The legalization of an 
activity, however, does not change the social, economic, business. and govern· 
mental costs. In fact , overwhelming field research and authoritative data 
indicates that the legalization of gambling activities dramatically increases these 
costs.S8 
Comparing gambling activities to iJlegal drug activities may appear con· 
tentious. but without belaboring the similarities, there appear to be more valid 
55. For a discussion or the impact of legalized gambling activities on those who can least 
afford to gamble, sec Irving K. Zola, OburvatiotlS on Gambling in a Lower-Class Setting, 10 Soc. 
PROBS. 353 (1963). Su also John R. Livernois. The Redistributive Effects of Lotteries; £videna 
from Canada, 15 PUB. FIN. Q. 339 (1987). &e gMuaUy. Marlin S. Feldstein, DistribUlional 
f:quiry and tf~ Optilntll Structure of Public Prices. 62 AM. EcoN. REV. 32 (1972). 
56. 138 CONGo REC S 187 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 1992) (statement of Scn. Simon). 
57. Id. (reprinting anicle of Economics Professor Earl Grinols. University of Illinois.) 
58. See gel1e".lIy CHARLES CLOTFELTER & PHILLI P COOK, SEL.uNG HOPE (1989). 
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economic and social parallels between the illegal drug trade and legal gambling 
enterprises than parallels between legal gambling organizations and traditional 
business enterprises. Historically. the United States has flirted with legalized 
gambling activities and with gambling philosophies,s9 Generation after 
genermion, the public forgot and then relearned thar the large soc ial , economic. 
business. and governmental costs60 demanded that all gambling activities be 
criminalized.61 As a consequence. gambling activities remained illegal 
throughout most of the twentieth century.62 The gambling interests' contention 
that various forms of gambling should now be legalized because previous 
generations were less sophisticated and less enlightened and because the 
economy of the nineteenth century was different is a specious argument. 
However, an examination of the gambling interests' argumem that the economies 
of the United States in the twentieth century can support legalized gambling 
activities must be undertaken.63 
The social costs of gambling have not significant ly changed over time 
because current data shows that when gambling activities are legaliz.ed, 
economies will be plagued64 with 100% to 550% increases65 in the numbers of 
addicted gamblers (probably within one to five years, but almost certainly within 
fifteen years).66 The soc ial, economic, business, and governmen tal costs are 
enormous. 67 Like alcohol and drug addiction, gambling is recogniz.ed as an 
addiction by the American Psychiatric Association (APA).6& 
59. See id at 35-37. 
60. !d. 
61. ld. at37. 
62. 11. m38. See generally Duane V. Burke, The LegaliwliQn o/Gambling in Ille United 
Slates: An Analysis and Forecast, ill GAMBLING AND SOCtEn' 39 (William Eadington ed .. 1976). 
63. See generally Burke, supra note 62. 
64. 138 CONGo Roc 5187 (daily ed. Jan. 22. 1992). 
65. Su, e.g .. CLOTFELTER & COOK, supra note 58, at 124-25: ALCOHOL & DRUG ABUSE 
ADMIN .• MD. DEP'T HEALTH & MENTAL HYGIENE, TASK FoRCE ON GAMBLING AODlcnON IN 
MARYLAND (1990) [hereinafter GAMBLING AODlCJ'ION IN MARYLAND]: VALERIE LORENZ, 
NATIONALCrR. PATHOLOGICALGAMBUNG, AN OVERVIEW OF PATHOLOGICAL GAMBLING 3 (1990). 
66. See Henry l.esieur, Compulsive Gambling, So c'y. MaylJune 1992, at 42, 43 
Ihereinafter Lesieur, Compulsive Gamblingl; Henry Lesieur. CompulSive Gambling: Documenting 
the Social and Economic COSIS I (Apr. 23. (991) (available from Professor Henry Lesieur. Illinois 
Stale University, Normal, Ill. ) [hereinafter Lesieur, Economic Costs]: see (llso CLOTFELTER & 
COOK, supra note 58, at 124-25; loRENZ, supra note 65, at 1-3. 
67. Over time, the problems intensify. 
[T]here will continue to be an increase in compulsive gamblers. devaslated 
families. serious emOlionaJ and physical complications. suicide attempts by 
gamblers and/or spouses, loss of work productivity, misuse of funds. crimes 
and bankruptcy from this very complicated, often hidden. but lreatable, mental 
disorder. This increase will accelerate, as govemments cominue to legalize and 
promote gambling. The social and economic costs of compu lsive gambling 
will also increase, unless communities and legislatures take a more active role 
in combating and preventing this psychiatric disorder. 
LoRENZ, supra nOie 65, at 10; su, ~.g" CBS Evening News (CBS lelevision broadcast. May 19, 
1992) (interviews with Dr. Valerie Lorenz, ElecUlive Director, Compulsive Gambling Clr" Inc" 
and Professor John Warren Kindt, University of Illinois); The 700 Club (television broadcast. (kl. 
I. 1992) (interviews with Terrence Gainor, Director Il linois State Police, Thomas Grey. Director of 
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II. CLARIFICATION OF THE DEANITIONAL PARAMETERS: 
REVIEWING THE STRATEGIC SOCIO-EcONOMIC COSTS 
OF LEGALIZING GAMBUNG ACTIVITIES 
[Vol. 43 
The soc iological. psychological, and psychiatric disciplines have their own 
definitions and debates involving what constitutes a "pathological gambler," an 
"addicted gambler," or a "compulsive gambler."69 These terms a~pear to be 
interchangeable. but the APA uses the term "pathological gambler." From the 
business-economic perspective, this analysis uses the lenn "compulsive gambler" 
or "compulsive economic gambler" (CEG), and the defi nitional parameters of 
these terms are basically the same as the APA' s parameters for the "pathological 
gambler."71 Therefore, these terms can be used in terchangcebly.n 
In the business-economic context,73 however, the term "problem gambler" 
or "problem economic gambler" (PEG) refers primarily to anyone who is losing 
approxinullely $1000 per year on gambling activilies,74 or more ap~ropriately, to 
anyone who is a member of the 10% of the public spending 65% .s (or between 
Legislative Affai rs, Illinois Church Act ion on Alcohol Problems (1LLCAAP). and Professor John 
Warren Kindt. University of 11Iinois). 
68. S~~ AM. PsVCIlIATRIC ASS·N. DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MEm'AL 
DtSORDERS § 312.31. at 324-2S (3d rev. cd. 1987) (hereinafter DSM .I1I ). Pathological gamblers 
cxhiblt 
a chronic and progrcssive failurc to resist impulses to gamble, and gambling 
behavior th:lt compromises, disrupts, or dam:lges persona\' family. or voca, 
lIonal pursuilS. The gambling preoccupation. urge. and activity increase during 
periods of stress. Problems that arise as a result of the gambling Jead to an 
intensification of the gambling behavior. Characteristic problems include 
extensive indebtedness and consequent default on debes and olncr financial 
responsibihtics, disrupted fami ly relationships. inattention to work, and finan· 
cially motivated illegal act ivities to pay for gambling. 
Id. at 324. 
69. For Ill1 introduttion 10 the definitional debate, see CLoTFELTER & COOK, supra note S8. 
at lOS. Su aiso GAMBLING ADDICTION IN MARVUND, supra note 6S. at 25; BETTER Gov'T ASS·N. 
Sit/1m nole 3. III 6·7. 
70. Se~ DSM-lll . supm note 68. aI 324-25. 
71 . "While the terms pathological and compulsive are technical ly Jl()( synonymous . .. pro-
fessionals and lay persons use lhem interchangeably." Lesieur. Compulsive Gambling. supra note 
66,3143. 
72. Id. 
73. This "economic" differentiation from "sociological factors" is important and has 
precedent. CLOTFfl.TF..R & COOK. supra note 58, al 11·12 (citing JOHN ROSECKANC£, GAM8L1NG 
WITHOlTT GUILT: THE Lffirm.l lZATKlNOF AN AMERICAN PASTIME 117 (1988). 
74. See infra nolCS 199·206 and accompanying text. The aclual national average is closer 
10 $~ than $1000 per year, bLU this amounl is expected 10 rise and using $ 1000 per year sunplifics 
the calculations for a wider readership. 
75. S~e CLOTFELTER & COOK. supra nOle S8. at 92-94 (report ing 1986 data). Most of the 
older data from Ihe state 10lteries suggested that 10% of the public gambled 50% of the gambling 
dollars to lhe stale lotteries and Ihat 20% gambled 65%. [d. a192. A more r~nl 1986 poll that is 
given prominence in the book Selling Hope suggested. however. that 10% of the public gambled 
65% of the dollars 10 Ihe state lotteries. [d. aI 92·93. Because other forms of gambling. legal and 
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50%76 and 84%71) of the legalized gambling dollars. Therefore, the PEG cate· 
gory includes not only the category of compulsive economic gamblers, or the 
APA's pathological gambler,18 but also includes sociological categories of 
"probable pathological gamblers," "possible pathological gamblers," "problem 
gamblers" (not to be confused with the PEG category), and other categories. 
Other than the pathological gambler category thai is synonymous with the CEG, 
the other sociological categories (and academic debates involving their defini· 
tional parameters) are beyond the scope of this Article. From a business-
economic standpoint. the only categories used are CEGs (consisting of 1.5%-5% 
of the public) and PEGs (consisting of 10% of the public that spends 65% of the 
legalized gambling dollars and includes the compulsive economic gamblers). 
In this context, every addicted or compulsive gambler negatively impacts 
between seven79 and seventeen80 other people.sl Although every person is 
responsible for his or her actions, it is specious to suggest that compulsive gam-
blers should have "willpower" or that they only hurt themselves.82 
"There is a general public attitude that if an individual is sufficiently 
foolish as to lose his or her wealth through gambling, why should society 
intervene?"S3 A similar question involves the degree to which government 
should "adopt a paternalistic role in caring for its citizens."84 On the other hand, 
if a state government creates and promotes "an industry that affects social 
illegal, involved 10% of the public gambling 84% of gambling dollars and because the state lotter-
ies provided a good benchmark of fairly reliable dala, it was reasonable to conclude (given the best 
data) that 10% of thc public in lcgalizcd gambling states would gamble approllimately 65% of the 
gambling dollars on all fonns of legal (and perhaps illegal) gambling. Id. 
76. ld. at 92 (reporting 1974, 1984, and 1985 data). 
77. Jd. at 93 (reporting 1974 data). Clinical evidence also tends to support the proposition 
Ihat 10% of the public spends 65% (or more) of the gambling dollars. "fAJccording to the Field 
Institute's California Poll, 18 percent of the state's adults bought 71 percent of the tickets" for the 
California lottery when it began in 1985. Brad Edmondson, The Demographics o/Gambling, AM. 
DEMOGRAPHICS, July 1986, al 40. Dr. Robert L. Custer of the Veterans Administration Medical 
Center noted, "Compulsive gamblers, who bocome most addicted to fast-action casino and sports 
betting, make up only 3% to 4% of those who gamble . . .. " Chris Welles, America's Gambling 
Fever~£verybody Wants a Piece o/Ihe AClion~But Is il Good/or Us?, Bus. WK., Apr. 24, 1989, 
at 112, 120. "But an additional l()')b to 15% bet more than they can afford . ... rrlhese two groups 
may account for close to half of all money wagered." !d. at 120. 
78. See DSM-III, supra note 68. at 324-25. 
79. By comparison, the well-documented national statistics of Alcoholics Anonymous con· 
servatively calculate that each alcoholic negalively impacts on seven other people, while the 
National Centcr for Pathological Gambling (renamed the Compulsive Gambling Center, Inc., in 
1992) and an authoritative Maryland report calculate that 17 other people are negatively impacted 
by every compulsive gambler. GAMBLING ADDICTION IN MARYLAND, supra note 65, at 2. The 
range of 10 to 17 negatively impacted people has also been calculated. Id. at 60; BElTER Gov'T 
ASS'N. supra note 3, at 18; ef. Susan M. Barbieri, "The Addietioll o/Ihe '90s": Compulsive 
Gambling Comes imo lIS OWII in Recessiollary Times, WASH. POST, Nov. 30, 1992, at D5 ("eight 
people are adversely affected"). 
SO. GAMBLING ADDICTION IN MARYLAND, supra note 65, at 2, 
81. See LoRENZ, supra note 65, at 5-7. 
82. See GAMBLING ADDICTION IN MARYLAND, supra note 65, at 2; LORENZ, supra note 65. 
83. ILL. STATE POLICE, supra nO(e 4, at 12. 
M. /d. 
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behavior and leads to addiction, should it be obligated to deal with the 
consequencesr,g5 
As states legitimize the medical model of pathological gambling and fund 
treatment facilities, insurance companies will be pressured to do the same. 
Businesses will also be put in the position of providing resources to deal 
with employee gambling-related problems including higher health insurance 
premiums. As a result, the burden of this funding will fall, not only on 
those who gamble but also on those who neither participate nor approve of 
the behavior. 86 
Blinded by the allure of legalized gambling's "fool's gold,"S7 few state 
legislatures have recognized that legalized gambling activities creme enonnous 
pressures Or! social-welfare budgets,S8 as well as large costs for businesses in 
generals9 and insurance companies in particular.9o In 1992, for example, insur~ 
ance fraud apparently related to legalized gambling activities (as distinguished 
from illegal gambling activities) was already $1.3 billion nationwide.91 
Pathological gamblers also borrow from life insurance policies, surrender 
their policies, and allow them to lapse or be revoked. This is COSily for the 
insurance companies and the insurance buying public as well as the gam-
blers' families. Gamblers operate uninsured automobiles, get into 
accidents, and become disabled or die without insurance.92 
Although these costs have not yet been calculated, one study of Gamblers 
Anonymous members "found that 47% percent had engaged in insurance related 
fraud or thefts where insurance companies had to pay the victims."9} The average 
amount of the fraud involved was calculated at $65,000.94 
These numbers are dramatic, but from a strategic perspective, the direct 
societal dysfunction caused by compulsive gamblers in a legalized gambling state 
(once gambling is legalized beyond the lottery)9S involves 1.5% to 5% of the 
public. The indirect societal dysfunction will be experienced by at least 10% to 
25% of the population, according to the most reasonable estimates, up to multiple 
85. Id. 
86. /d. at 12-13. 
87. Paul Glastris & Andrew Bates, Tilt Fool's Gold in Gambling , U.S. NEWS & WORLD 
REP.,Apr.I,I99I,at22. 
88. Stt: gtnerally id. 
89. !d. 
90. Su Henry LesiC\Jf & Kenneth Puig, Insurance Prob/tlns and Pel/le%gical Gambling, 
3 1. GAMDLING BEHAV. 123 ( 1987). 




95. There is academic dtbate concerning whether and to what extent the stale lotteries con· 
lribtlle 10 lhe increase in compulsive gamblers. See CLOTf'E.L TER & COOK. supra note 58, al 104-05, 
126·21. 
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impacts on 100% of the population. In other words, if every compulsive gambler 
negatively affects seven to seventeen other people, in a saturated gambling com-
munity or state, such as Nevada, 7% to 8% theoretical compulsive gamblers<J6 
multiplied by seventeen negatively impacted people yields 119% to 136% of the 
population. In such a scenario. some people are negatively impacted multiple 
times by compulsive gamblers. and multiple impacts are experienced by a subset 
of the population. Of course, because taxpayers have to pay for these societal 
costs, the entire population is negatively impacted by increased taxes. In this 
regard, Nevada's status as a comparatively low-tax stale is misleading because 
Nevada exports its socio-economic costs 10 other states, particularly California. 
when Nevada's tourists return to their home states. This taxpayer scenario 
reveals only one of several ways in which the taxpayers directly and indirectly 
subsidize the gambling industry. 
Unlike traditional businesses. legalized gambling activities create eco-
nomic. business. social. and governmental costs by creat ing addicted gamblers, 
similar to alcohol and drug addicts. In fact. there are numerous parallels between 
these three addictions.97 Clinicians treating the 1.5% to 5% CEGs note that 
CEGs are likely to have alcohol problems. 98 Skeptics of gambling cite social 
studies indicating that. like a drug addict, a compulsive gambler is also a type of 
addict.99 
One of the most persuasive, but invalid, arguments ror legalizing various 
fonns of gambling is that illegal gambling occurs throughout soc iety and that by 
legalizing the gambling, the gamblers can be taxed. A 1992 Gallup Poll indi-
cated that 61 % of the public was still accepting this argument. loo even though the 
public trend in general indicated a big decline in approval of legal betting on 
sports and marginal declines in approval of various games of chance--even the 
96. See LoRENZ. supra note 65.3t 3 (reporting 4% to 7.7% of adotescents may be compul-
sive gamblers). In t992, the majority viewpoint was thai 5% compulsive gamblers was Ihe top 
percentage for the adult populotion. See GALLUP ORGANIZATION. NF.~'SSF.RVICE 3 (Dec. 16, 1992) 
(hereinafter NEWS SERVICE 12-16-921. However. some clinical studies were reporting 7% to 8%. 
ALTA. LOTTERIES & GAMING. GAMBUNG AND PROBLEM GAMBLING I'll ALBERTA 18 (Jan. 1994) 
(prepared by Wynne Resources, Ltd .• Edmonton, Alta.) Ihereinafter ALTA. GAMING]; see BETTER 
GOV'T ASS'N, supra note 3, at 30. For tne adolescent populalion, Or. Durand Jacobs of the Lorna 
Lind:. University Medical School was reporting 4% to 6%. Su Durand F. Jacobs, Illegal ami 
UlUlocullle,.tet!: A Review Q/1'e1mage Gambling and the ,./ight of ClrUdrm 0/ Problem Gamblers 
;/1 America. in COMPULSIVE GAMI:IUNG: THEORY. RESEARCH, AND PRACTICE 249 (Howard J. 
Shaffer el al. cds., 1989). Depc::nding on definitional categories, the Gallup Organization in 1992 
was reporting 7% of the United Stales population in 1992 liked to gamble "a lot" and 9% admined 
Ihat Ihey "gambled too much." NEWS SERVICE 12-16-92. supra. lit 3. With a margin of error of 
.5%, tnese percentages obviously parallel nnd !otIpportlhe 1.5% 10 5% figure for CEGs and lhe 10% 
figure for PEGs. 
97. See CLOTFELTER & COOK, supra note 58, at 96. In Ihe family of the pathological gam-
bier. "almost always tnere is a parental history of alcoholism." LOltF..N'/_ sllpra nOie 65, at 5. 
98. Lesieur. Compulsive Gamblin8. supra nOle 66. aI 45-46. In 1992, a study of males in a 
sample taken from Gamblers Anonymous revealed tnat 48% "met the criteria for alcohol abuse or 
dependency." Id. 
99. See. e.g., CLOTFELTER & COOK, supra note 58, at 96. 
100. GALLUP ORGANIZATION, NfiWS SERVICE 2 (Dec. 5. ! 992) (hereinafter NEWS SERVICE 
12-5-921-
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popular stale lotteries. 101 The "thrill factor," as well as the better odds, associated 
with illegal gambling dictate. however. thal once a form of gambling is legalized 
the "thrill" is generally lost. and the illegal gamblers must then move their dollars 
into other forms of illegal gambling to recapture the thrill-thereby promoting a 
vicious cycle toward harder and harder forms of gambling. 
The often ignored gravamen of this debate is that the authoritative national 
statistics and the field research indicate that once gambling is legalized--once 
gambling becomes sociologically acceptable l02-lhe number of compulsive 
gamblers increases 103 from .77%104 to between 1.5% to 5% of the population. lOS 
J 01. Id. at 1-3. For analyses or the economic issues inherent in state I(){teries, see Roger E. 
Brinner & Charles T. Clotfelter, An £collm7lic Appraisal oiStafe wfteries, 28 NAT'L TAX J. 395 
(1975). See generally Gerald F. Kaminski, Promo/jOilai Games and the Ohio wnery Law~ 39 U. 
ON. L REV. 163 (1970); David L Rados, Tlte Nllmbl!rs Game: A" Economic and Comparatil'e 
Analysis, 16Q. REV. EcON. & Bus. 19 (1976). 
102. See BE.TfER Gov'r ASS'N, supra note 3, at 2. 
103. See generally CLOTFELTER & COOK, supra note 58, at 124·25. 
104. U.S. COMMISSION ON THE REV. OF THE NAT'L PoL'y TOWARD GAMBLING, GAMBLING 
IN AMERICA 73 (Gov't Printing Off. 1976) (data collected from 1975) [hereinafter U.S. COMM'NON 
GAMBLING]; see CLOTFELTER & COOK. supra note 58, at 124-25; su also U.S. COMMISSION ON THE 
REV. OFruE NATL Pm.'v TOWARD GAMBUNG: FtRST lNlD.tM REPORT (Gov't Printing Off. 1975). 
105. CLOTFELTER & COOK. supra note 58, at 124-25. After the legalization o f gambling 
activities, the percentage of the JXlpulation who will gamblc incrcases. In 1974, a state lottery "was 
resJXlnsible for inducing about one·quaner of the adult population who would not otherwise have 
done so to participate in commercial gambling." Id. at 105. In addilion. the number of pathological 
gamblers began to climb dramatically. '"(PJolls conducted in Ohio. the Delaware Valley, and New 
York State in 1984 and 1985 produced estimates of the prevalence of 'probable pathological gam-
blers' between 1.4 percent and 3.4 percent." Id. at 125 (citing HENRY LEstEUR, REPORT ON 
PATIfOlOGlCAL GAMBLING IN NEW JERSEY 1 ( 1988». 
More recently, Ihe Minnesofa Depanment of Health eSlimated thaI 2% of its 
adult citizens were suffering from this disorder. In 1986!he Ohio Stale Lonery 
Commi!>Sion set the figure at 2 1f2% in its state., RUlgers University estimated 
the incidence at over 3% in the Philadelphia/Atlantic City area, and Ihe Ncw 
York State Office of Mental Health learned that 4.2% of New York state's IXlP-
ulation could be classified as probable pathological gamblers (National 
Council. 1988). 
The ratc among teenagers, 0% in [979. has riscn to a range of 4% to 7.7% a 
decade later. 
Both Gamblers Anonymous (a self·help group for compulsive gamblers 
established in Los Angeles in 1957) and the National Council for Compulsive 
Gambling (an educational agency incorporated in 1975) consider these figures 
10 be conserv3live. They believe that there are at least ten million compulsive 
gamblers in the United Stales at this time. 
LORENZ, .fll(lro note 65, at 3. Over time, the percentage of the population that is addicted to gam-
bling has risen along wilh thc increased legalization of gambling activities. In 1990, the percentage 
of the United States population addicted to gambling was approaching or was already within a 
range of approximately 1.5% to 5% and was continuing to increase. Su, e.g.,ALTA . GAMING, 
supra note 96, at 17-18; Set also BElTER Gov'T ASS'N, supra note 3. at 28-30. As saturated gam· 
bling economics, Nevada and Atlantic City top the range at 3% to 5% (or more) compulsive 
gamblers. See loRENZ, supra note 65, at 3. 
Evidence suggests that in areas where more fonns of gambling are legal, the 
incidern.:e of problem and pathological (compulsi\·c) gambling is also higher. 
F 
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This phenomenon will definitely occur; the only debate is how soon it will hap -
pen. 106 This increase could occur within one to five years, but some claim it 
could also take up to fifteen years before the upper numbers are reached. 
Furthermore, the next generation consisting of today's teenagers will double this 
range as they age; in 1992, the range of adolescents who were already problem or 
compulsive gamblers was between 4% and 15%.107 Theoretically, to maintain 
the same "quality of life" after the legalization occurs, social-welfare budgets 
would have to increase by 100% to 550%. The pressure on elected officials to 
increase taxes to address these social-welfare costs will be enormous. These 
costs do not include the costs of rehabilitating any compulsive gamblers. If soci-
ety should choose to rehabilitate, the costs would be between $17,000 and 
$42,000 per person. 108 
For example, in a population base of 10 million people (such as the State of 
JIlinois, which is approximately 11.43 million),l09 the number of compulsive 
gamblers before legalization would be 77,000, while the number after legaliza-
tion would be 150,000 to 500,000. Because the minimum increase after 
legalization would double automatically to 150,000, this phenomenon should be 
refelTcd to as the post legalization "minimum doubling rule."11O Nationwide, "it is 
In 1974, fewer than I % of the adult population in the United Stales were recog-
nized as compulsive gamblers while the comparable r.lte for Nevada was 2.5%. 
Recent surveys done in New York, New Jersey, Maryland, amI Iowa and in 
Quebe<:. Canada, revealed that problem and pathological gambling in Iowa, 
where there is less [egali7.cd gambling, was .. bout half thm in other states and 
Quebec, where the studies were made. 
Lesicur, Compulsive Gambling, supw note 66, at 43. Among hospi1l11i7.ed psychiatric patients in 
onc report, 6.5% were pathological g .. uublers. hI. at 45. 
106. LORENZ, mpw note 65, at 3-4. "Slot machine addicts, poke I' machine addicts, [ol1el)' 
players and bingo addicts tend to 'bottom out' in less timc than other types of g:mlbJers. IlsLlally 
within two to three years o f stnning to gamble on this particular OlC"tivity.'· fd. lit 4: ,'I/e CLOTfELTER 
& COOK, supra note 58, at 124·25. 
107. BE"rrER GOV'T ASS'N, supra note 3, at 28; see also Art Levine, f'Iaying the Atlolescelll 
Odds, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 18, 1990, at 51. 
108. See GAMBLING ADDICTION tN MARYLAND, s!tpra note 65, at 29·30, 36·63. In 1990, 
Maryland nlready had eight clinics and treatment programs for compulsive gamblers. Id. at 38-49. 
As of 1992. the Compulsive Gambling Center in B<lltimorc, Maryland chnrged $ 17,000 to 520,000 
for the first month of treatment while the Philadclphiu Psychintric Hospital, which Dccame the 
Belmont Center for Comprehensive Treatment iJJ MUR"h of 1992 . historically cllllrged morc. 
Imerview with Dr. Valerie Lorenz. Ellecutivc Director, Compulsive Gambling Or., [nc .. in 
B<lltimore. Md. (Dcc. 10, 1992) [hereinafter Lorenz Interv iew] . TrclltnK'nt costs of up to $20,000 
per week for in.patients have been reported, Id. These costs did not include post-clinic/hospital 
treatments on an oUl-patient status . /d. Therefore. an average cost uf $20JKlQ pcr person is probn· 
bly quite reasonable. Ol11patient costs are significantly less . For ellnmpie, "Two f<ldlitics 
supplying outpatient services for pathological gnmblers provided. , . estimates of $3,000 to $5,000, 
and $8,000 to $10,000 as the total treatment costs." BEITER GOV'T ASS'N, .wpm nOte 3, at 12. 
109. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T COMMERCE, 1990 CENs us,repril1led ill T HE WORLD 
ALMANAC & BOOK OF FACTS 387 (1993). 
110. An ellamplc of the minimum doubling rule is theoretically renected in Maryland which 
had a doubling in the numbers of both patho[ogicnl nnd problem gamblers between 1976 and 1988. 
GAMBLING ADDICTION IN MARYLAND, supra note 65, llt 55. Of course. Mnryland was nOI entirely 
gambling-free before 1976, but the legalized gambling then was mllch lcS5 elltcnsivc than in 1988. 
66 Drake Law Review [Vol. 43 
evident that the prevalence o f pathological gambling has doubled during a period 
of increased access to legalized gambling and significant growth in the legal 
wagering of Americans."111 This phenomenon is often identified as the result of 
both soc ial acceptability and accessibility.1l2 The implication is thal all of the 
soc ia-economic, business, and governmental costs associated with gambling 
addicts before the legalization of gambling could automatically be multiplied by 
two, or increased by 100%, because at a minimum these costs will double after 
gambling is legalized. A reasonable estimate from national statistics would place 
the number of post legalization compulsive gamblers in Illinois at an average of 
about 2%, or 200,000 people. h should also be noted Ihat the type of compulsive 
gamblers would also c hange from the romanticized view of unseen people gam-
bling in back alleys to include th e e lderly, ' 1) the poor, I 14 minorities,IIS 
housewives,116 teenagers,111 and even preteens. I IS All of these calegories are par-
ticu larl y susceptible to becoming compu lsive gamblers. 
From a business perspect ive, the best employees are Type-A personalities 
because, by definition, they are aggressive achievers; they also constitute the 
personalities most susceptible to becoming compulsive gamblers. I 19 In 1974, 
"compul sive gamblers attending Gamblers Anonymous typically were white. 
'This estimale of doubling is also conseryati"e because Ihe gambling industry in Maryland has 
always exceeded the national norm." Id. 
II \. /d. at 56. 
112. BElTER GOV'T Ass'N, $/Ipr« note 3, at 2. 
I 13. LoRENZ, $lIfira note 65, at 3; see CWmLTER. & COOK, :mpra note 58, at 96-97. 
114. LoRENZ, supra note 65, at 3. Regardless of the compulsive gambling issue, the poor 
lose proportionately more of their disposable income. although the overall percentage of income 
gambled aplK'8n 10 be a conslan\. cutting across the socio-economic slK'ctrum. Accordingly. a 
widespread crilicism of legalized gambling aClivilies, including the stale loueries, is thai legaliz.od 
gambling conSlitUies a "regressive tax" on the poor. CLOTFELTER & COOK, supra note 58, al 215, 
222-27. Those persons making under $10,000 per year gamble an average of 5.5% of their income 
(or $550 per year). St'e id. at 99: Earl L. Grinols. Analysis of the Major Impacts of Off-Track 
Gambling in Champaign, Illinois 3 (Sept. 23, 1991 ) (referencing this gambling of 5.5% of incomes 
under $10.000 per year as ··sickening (O contemplate"). 
I 15. LoRENZ, sUfira note 65. at 3: see CWTFEI.. TER. & CooK, supra note 58, at 96-99. 
116. LoRENZ, sltpraoote65,at3. 
117. The compulsiYe gambling rate alOOng teenagers is 4% to 8%. Id. TIle trend is toward 
an increase in Ihis rate. Studies by Dr. Durand Jacobs (reporting 4% to 6%) and other studies place 
the compUlsive gambling rate among teenagers between 4% 1015%. BElTER GoV'T ASS'N, supra 
oole 3, at 30. app. G. 
118. In the United Kingdom, preteen gambling and preteen addicled gamblers have become 
a national disgrace. and these problems have had substantial negative impacts on the educational 
system and the economy. Sue Fisher, MetlSuring Pathological Gambling in Children: The Case of 
Fruit Machines in the U.K, 8 1. GAMBLING SnJo. 263, 270 (1992) (reporti ng 9% of the children in 
one leS! scored as "probable pathological gamblers"). Legislation designed to make preteen gam-
bling aclivilies illegal was proposed in Parliament; speci fi cally.lhe 1988 Gaming Machines Bill 
and Ihe 1989 Amusements Machines (Protection of Children) Bill. ItL at 264. Neither bi ll received 
a second reading. but the controversy reappeared in 1992. Id. In any evcnt.this legislation was like 
closing Ihe bam door after tlK: horse had already Icft. The best public policy is for governmenls to 
avoid initially becoming infatuated with Ihe gambling scduClress. 
119. See LORENZ, supra note 65, at 3-6. 
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middle aged, middle-class men,"120 but by 1990 all groups of people were fepre -
sented,I21 In other words. the addiction of gambling is both nondiscriminatory 
and an equal opportunity destroyer. 
The mix may change, but in a population base of ten million, there will be 
an estimated 200,000 compulsive gamblers. To go back to the quality of life 
existing before gambling was legalized. it would be necessary to rehabilitate 
approximately 200.000 people minus the pre-existing 77 ,000 compulsive gam-
blers. At a very conservative cost estimate of $5,000 to $20,000 per compulsive 
gambler,lll the total bill would be $665 million to $2.6 billion. From a cost-ben-
efit perspective, the sensible conclusion is that states should never legalize 
gambling in the first place. 
Ironically. once a state legalizes gambling, that state can become addicted 
to the initial tax revenues. These revenues, however, usually constitute only a 
minimal part of a state's budget.12) A one -cent increase in a state's sales tax 
would generally bring in more revenues than all of that state's lottery revenues .124 
In Illinois. for example. a one-cent increase in the sales tax would more {han 
compensate for the entire revenues from the state lottery (and all other forms of 
legalized gambling). 
By comparison with the $665 million to $2.6 billion rehabilitation cost for 
a state like Illinois, the entire 1992 budget for Illinois was approximately $26 bil-
lion . 12~ The cost of rehabilitating compulsive gamblers should be referred to as 
"rehabilitative cost," and it consists of the cost of making a compulsive gambler 
"whole again." The estimate of a $20,000 cost per compulsive gambler is a fair 
and conservative estimate because some estimates are as high as $42,000,126 even 
before outpatient costs are included . 127 
If gambling organizations wish to legalize gambling in a particular stale, It 
only makes sense that those organizations should pay at least in part for the 
rehabilitation. l2I! This policy conforms to the well-known principle of 
"internalizing the externalities," that is, costs should be borne by those organiza-
tions creating the costs, not by taxpayers. In South Dakota, for example. 
legislation permitting legalized gambling also prodded the gambling interests to 
address the rehabilitative costS.129 Even so, the amounts involved arc obviously 
inadequate because theoretically those amounts would only pay to rehabilitate a 
120. GM·mUNG ADDICTION IN MARYLAND, supra note 65. at 20; LORENZ. supra note 65, at 
3. 
121. loRENZ, supra note 65. at 3. 
122 See sUI,ra note 108 and accompanying tex!. 
123. 138 CONGo REC. St87 (dai ly cd Jnn. 22. 1992) (reprinting arlicie of Econom ics 
Professor Earl Grinols, University of Illinois). 
t24. Seeid. 
t 25. 1u..INOIS STATE. B UDGC"T: FISCAL YE.\R 1992 7,64·65 Ihereinafler ILL. 1992 BUDGETJ. 
126. As of 1992, the cost of an in.pnticnt 3D-day program at the Philadelphia Psychinlric 
Hospital was reportedly between $15.000 and $42,000 e:u;lw;ive of poslhospitali;r;3lion costs, See 
Lorenz. Interview. supra note 108; see also silpra note 108 and accompanying text. 
127. See silpra note 108 and accompanying tex!. 
128. Lesieur, Complt/sive Gamblillg, SliP'" note 66. at 49. Grinols Champaign Report, 
supra nOle 114, at 5 (Gambling's Negative Externalities). 
129. See gcncrally S.D. COlm·1EO LAWS ANN. § 42·78 (1991). 
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few people. In Illinois, the Horse Racing Act provides that the Racing Board 
shall allocate and distribute $750,000 per year directly "to non-profit organiza-
tions that provide medical and family. counse ling , and similar services,"I:\/) 
Under this wording, theoretically nothing need be allocated to the practical treat-
ment programs. 
In any event , rehabilitative cost is only onc factor in the "quality-oC-life" 
c;'licul aiions that need to be made before a state legalizes gambling. Projections 
of increased social-welfare costs also need to be included in quality-of-life calcu-
lations. These costs are more difficult to calculate because gambling has been 
illegal in the Uni ted Stales throughout most of the twentieth century. lJl 
Therefore. specialized socia-economic data will not be available until after a 
developing gambling state like Illinois or South Dakota transforms itself into 
another Nevada-eltploiting and being exploited by all types of gambling. 
The data from Nevada is not representative for two major reasons. First . 
Nevada is an anomaly 132 because it is basically a desert state whose economy is 
based primarily on people who vi sit Nevada and then take the costs and ramifica-
tions of any problems back to their home states.1)) Second, the nonacademic data 
from Nevada has the reputation of being untrustworthy .134 
Therefore . a state with a traditional business-oriented economy has to be 
equ ivalently givcn over to ga mbling before reliable data can be ge nerated. This 
is a high cost to pay , especially because practically all of the pre-exist in g eco-
nomic projections and studies already undermine the promises made by gambl ing 
organizations. 
Given these constra ints, the starting point for determining the increased 
soc ial-welfare costs mllst necessarily be a direct calcul ation involving the antici -
pated increase in compulsive gamblers from .77% to between 1.5% and 5% of 
the population. As might be ex pected. probably 5% to 8% of Nevada's resident 
popul ation consists of compulsive gamblers, although many Nevada officiols arc 
reluctant to admit these nu mbers, and of course, these numbers do not include the 
many visitors who come to Nevada and return to their home stales as ncw com-
pulsive gamblers. 
Therefore , in a popul ation base of IO million. the increase in compulsive 
ga mblers from .77% to a postlegalization range of between 1.5% and 5% would 
mean that social-welfare costs would incre .. se by a multiplier somewhere 
between 2 .. nd 6.5P~ The conservat ive average "3% of the public" multiplier 
wou ld be 3.9. Theoretically, social-we lfare budgets would have to inercase 
between approltimatcly 100% and 550%, with Ihe average being 300%. In 
130. ILL. REV. STAT. th. 8. para. 3 1.1 (II ) (1992) . 
t 31. See COLTFElTEIi & COOK. supra nOle 58, al ]8. 
132. See . e.g., ILL. STATE PoUCE, IUI,ra nole 4. at 5. 
133. " IC jompulsivc gambling IS II re latively invisible problem in Nevada aoo Allantic City 
because most of the afniclcd (Ire touri sts. Consequently, the problems which arise from this addic· 
tion are likely to show up (It the im.1 ividuat's placc of residence and nO! in the casino CiTY .. . . " Id. 
at 12. 
134. Set! cel1ually BcrrER GOV'T Ass'N, Sllpra nole 3. 
135. This muhiplier as The lowest parameter obviously represents the posttegalizlltion 
"minimum doubting ro le:' See supra nOles 119- 12 and accompanying lex!. 
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Illinois, for example, the social-welfare and service components l36 of the total 
1992 state budget of $26 billion were $7.3 billion, In If only 10% of these com-
ponents were related, directly or indirectly, to compulsive gambling problems. 
such as lost income or welfare checks, IJS spousal abuse, child abuse and neglect. 
and associated heahh COS1S,lJ9 the theoretical conservative increase would be 
from $730 million to between $1.5 to $4.75 billion. If these social-welfare com-
ponents were utilized by a pure cross-section of society, 10% would be a fairly 
representative estimate.140 These social-welfare components, however. are 
designed to address the very types of problems experienced and reflected by 
problem gamblers and their families, but usually without directly addressing the 
compulsive gambling problem per se. Therefore, the 10% estimate is probably 
too conservative. Furthermore, because every compulsive gambler negatively 
impacts between seven and seventeen other pcople,141 virtually the entire popula-
tion is negatively affected. Therefore. a 10% impact on social services is too 
conservative.142 
Even the conservative projected increases in social-welfare costs arc so 
large that these numbers alarm governmental, charitable, and social-welfare 
administrators, but because the hard data will follow from those states that first 
leap into the abyss, these numbers are only starting points. The relative ncwness 
of the legalized gambling phenomenon means that the time-lag during which 
these numbers are reached will vary from state to state and cannot yet be ca lcu-
lated within precise parameters. It is a virtual certainty, however, that these 
numbers will eventually be reached; the only questions are how quickly. and 
whether the social-welfare budgets can stay ahead of the increased demands. The 
136. In Illinois, these eomponems include '"medical assi ~tancc. income support, child and 
eommunilY care programs, and olhcr heahh and social services." ILl .. 1992 BUDGET.sul'rt1 nOIC 
125, at 8. 
131. [d. 
138. United States Sen:ltor Pmll Simon has noted these prohlems: 
An example is the State lotteries. If you go into [he poorest section of 
Chicago or East S1. Louis, you will see people lined up to buy louery tickets. I 
am nm on a crusade to do away with State lotteries, and if you were to take a 
vote in Ihose very communitics. I think they would want to keep them, because 
those lottcries represen[ hope for people_ 
We have to lellm to gi\-c peoplc morc substantinl reasons for hope. 
And we have to find way[s] of raising revenue Ilmt do not impose on the 
weakest and poorest in our society. 
138 CONGo REC. S181 (daily cd, Jan. 22, 1992) (statement of Senator Simon). One study noted that 
18% of compUlsive gamblers sought "public assistance." GAMlll1NG ADDICT[ON IN MARYLAND, 
supra note 65, at 94. Included in this 18% figure were 6% who sought medical treatment public 
assistance. [d. 
139. The theoretical sociological costs are enormous. See generally Lesieur. Compldsh'e 
Gambling, supra note 66, at 44-48. 
140. See, e.g., CLOTFEI.TER & COOK. supra note 58 , at 92-94; GAMBLING ADDICTION [N 
MARYLAND, supra note 65, at 94 (reponing 18% of pathological gnmblers sought public assis-
tance); see also supra notcs 19-80 and aeeomp.1nying tex\. 
141. Barbieri, supra note 19. at D5 . "'For evcry problem gambler, it is estimated that cight 
people arc adversely affected." /d. 
142. GAMDLlNG ADDICTION IN MARYI_ANO, supra IlOle 65, n12. 
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answer to the second question is that even under the most optimistic projections 
and scenarios. social-we lfare budgets will probably not be able to meet 100% of 
the increased demands. With regard to the first question involving how quickly 
the increased social-welfare costs will develop, some interesting observations can 
be made from the experiences in South Dakota. 
III. LEGALIZED GAMBLING IN DEADWOOD, SOUTH DAKOTA: 
A BLACK HOLE OF ECONOMICS IN THE BLACK HILLS 
Before 1988, South Dakota did not permit any major form of legalized 
gambling except for the state lottery, which was initiated in 1987.143 In 1988, the 
electorate voted to allow limited casino gambling to begin in 1989 in Deadwood, 
Sou th Dakota,loW theoretically to help the local economy.14S The gambling inter-
ests made their traditional promises to persuade the electorate, including the 
promises that only a few casinos would be allowed and only in DeadwooeV46 
Beginning November I, 1989, the casinos were moving into Deadwood, and by 
1990, gambling had been initiated on the South Dakota Indian reservations as a 
direct byproduct of the vote for the casinos. 147 Video-lottery teminals (VLTs),'.a 
143. 'The 1986 public vote was 60% in favor of a state lottery. and the lottery began opera-
tion in 1981. CLOTfELTER & COOK. supra notc 58. at 146; su I. Nelson Rose. Gambling and the 
Law: 1992 Elections Endless Fields of Dreams ( 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
Professor I. Nclson Rose. Whittier Law School). 
144. Jeffry Bloomberg. State's Attorney for Lawrence County, S.D., Speech before the 
Coalition of Concerned Citizens Against Gambling in Jo Davicss County, (Nov. 11, 1991) 
{hereinafter Speech by Jeffry Bloomberg]; Lener from Jeffry Bloomberg. State's Attorney for 
Lawrence County. S.D .• 10 John Warren Kindt. Professor. University of Illinois (Jan. 4. 1993) 
(containing crime statistics for Lawrence County. S.D.) [hereinafter leiter from Bloomberg to 
Kindt). 
145. Speech by Jeffry Bloomberg • .fupra note 144; Richard Jameson. Speech before the 
South Dakota Citizens Forum Against Video-Lottery Terminals (Oct. 18, 1992). Two of the most 
potent. but invalid, arguments used by the proponenls of legalized gambli ng are that gambling 
activities will help thc economy and contribute substantial revenues to education. This latter argu-
ment has been used since 1964. when it was u~ in an unsuccessful campaign for a state lottery in 
Cali forni a. CLOTFELTER & COOK, supra note 58, at 151. In fact, legalized gambling directly 
attacks educational interests both philosophically (e.g., "get rich quick") and fiscally. because edu-
cation funding in state budgets usually shrinks proportionately as it is divcned to social-welfare 
programs as thcy arc pressured by the increasing social ills caused by legalized gambling activities. 
146. ''The voters were told the casinos would be isolated. low-stakes tourist attractions-
mountain towns in Colorado; Deadwood. Sooth Dakota; ri verboats in Iowa." Rose. supra note 143, 
at 5. 
141. Pursuant to California Y. Cabazon Ban.1 of Mission Indians , 480 U.S. 202 (1987). once 
II state legalizes gambling, that state cannot prewnt the Indian reservations located in that state 
fro m developing the same type of legalized gambling enterprises. rd. at 210-12. This case 
prompted the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988. Pub. L. No. 100-491, 102 Stat. 2467 {l988) 
(codified at 25 U.S.c. §§ 2101 -2721. 18 U.S.c. §§ 1166-1168). 
148. Video-poker machines in South Dakota were init iated on October 21. 1989. Video-
machine gambling is known as the "crack-cocaine" of legalized gambling. It is not uncommon for 
a person who begins video-machine gambling to become addicted within one year. The Sooth 
Dakrna Lottery Commission reported a 1.4% compulsive gambling rate by October 1991. which 
was within two years of its inception. Another 199 1 report that specifically referenced two years of 
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which were allowed under the sa me legislation as the lottery. began operating on 
October 21. 1989. and were commonplace throughout South Dakota by 1992. 
The residents of South Dakota were apparently unfamiliar with the basic princi-
pic driving the legalized gambling interests - that is. gambling organizations 
continually need to ensure their survival via rapid expansion, finding unexploited 
geographic areas or new market shares, or both.149 In most cases, legalized 
gambli ng activities constitu te reverse pump-priming and drai n the economy. 
eventually pulling everything into what has been described as a "black hole of 
economics."lso 
The legislators in Colorado apparently did not monitor the South Dakota 
experiences because a referendum was passed in 1990 allowing casino gambling 
in Colorado. Restrictions were built into the new Colorado law and were sup-
posed to limit casino activit ies, but failed.l~l 
Certainly .... [three Colorado towns) have gotten more than they 
bargained for. Instead of a few slot machines, full-blown casinos owned by 
L.1S Vegas veterans and real-estate developers have swept in, swallowing 
many mom-and-pop businesses along the way. Water, sewer and traffic 
systems have been overwhelmed, crime has increased , non-cas ino busi -
nesses face huge tall; increases and the relative calm of local politics has 
been shattered.m 
One longtime resident. John Starkey, a NASA electronics specialist, who 
helped organize the campaign to allow cas inos and who even slood on street cor-
ners gathering signatures, regretted his former support despite a pan-time job at a 
cas ino and planned to move out of town.1S3 Mr. Starkey's reasoning was not 
atypical of similar scenarios. "We moved here because we liked the small town," 
he said. "We wanted a helping hand, but we didn't wan I devaslalion."l~~ 
These objections and the business-economic scenario arc almost identical 
to the experiences of Deadwood, South Dakota. two years earlier. 1S5 The busi-
ness-economic environment caused by the Colorado casinos forced so many of 
the pre -existing local businesses to close that by 1992 residents of Central City 
and Black Hawk. Colorado. hud to drive forty miles for a quart of milk. 1st. 
In any event, the Deadwood. South Dakota experience se rves as a micro -
cosm of a developing gambli ng community ~a black hole of economics in (he 
VLTs calculated that over 2 .5% of the South D;lkota public was :llre:ldy :lddiclcd 10 gambling. 
BETTER. GOV'T ASS·N. supra note 3, al 10. 
149. See 138 Calow. RI'£' S187 (dai ly cd. Jan . 22,1992) (reprinling article of Economics 
Professor Earl Grinols, UniversiTY of Illinois). 
ISO. See, e.g., AIr. Sicwcrs, Casino Hopes (Illd Fears, CII!. SUN·TIMES, Apr. 12. 1992. at I. 
67 (referring 10 I. Nelson Rose of The Whiuicr School of Law '·who likened gambling 10 a 'block 
hole sucking all oflhe money OUT oflhe loc:lI economy'"). 




155. Speech by Jeffry Bloomlx:rJ:, SU/Jra note t44. 
156. Charlier, mpm note 42, at6. 
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Black Hills of South Dakota. Given the limitations of its geographic location and 
the demographics of its population, South Dakota as a whole serves as a good 
c)tampie of what some other states and locales might e)tpect if they accept gam· 
bling activities and the gambling philosophy. The Deadwood scenario also sheds 
light upon the time·lag problem involving the speed with which a socic:reconomic 
area is impacted and social·welfare costs increase. Although Deadwood was 
obviously not in a pristine economic petri dish and although arguments can be 
made that the influ)t of casino people impacted on the results. as of 1993, the 
South Dakota scenario served as the best case hi story of a rapidly developing 
casino economy. 
Shortly after the advent of legalized casino gambling, the Deadwood casino 
economy lurched forward. The state attorney's office in Deadwoodl.S7 indicated 
that within appro)timately two years: 
I. Child abuse cases had increased 42% to 43% (from 350 to 500 cases); 158 
2. Police costs had increased 80% to lOO%UII with a virtual doubling of the 
number of police officers; 160 
3. Although national statistics had increased only slightly,I61 crime in the 
Deadwood area had increased overall by 10% (although prior to 1989 the 
crime rate had been declining) with a 50% increase in felonies. 162 
Furthermore. there were 614 Class One misdemeanors or felonies in 1988. 
and 1070 in 1992. a 75% increase in four years;l6J 
4. Domestic violence and assauhs had risen 80%;164 and 
5. Burglaries and writing of bad checks had increased, 1M while illegal drug. 
prostitution. and drunk driving cases had remained relatively the same. l66 
It shou ld be noted that these statistics have not peaked and will probably increase. 
Although the statistics relating to social problems are dramatic, the main point is 
that the time lag between the initiation of a gambl ing economy and the advent of 
large social· welfare costs and police costs can be quite short, contrary to what 
151. Speech by Jeffry Bloomberg. supra nOle 144. 
158. /d. In one siudy. 8% of compulsive gamblers and 31% of their spouses physically 
abused their children. Lesieur. Compulsj~'e Gombling. s"pra note 66. at 41 (referencing a 51udy by 
Dr. Valerie I...orenz). 
159. Speech by Jeffry Bloomberg. supra note t44. 
160. Even though casino gambling began late in {he ye:'Ir (on November I. 1989). "/I]he 
police force has almost doubled. from five officers in 1989 10 eighl in 1991" with another officer to 
be added in 1992. Carl Noga. Deadwood. S.D .. A Model for Jo Dav/tss. FREEPORT JOURNAL· 
STANOARO. Nov. 25.1991. all. 5. 
161 . Speech by Jeffry Bloomberg, supra note t44. 
162. Compare BENCHMARK 1988: ANNUAL REPORT Of THE SOUTH DAKOTA UNIFIEO 
JUDtCJAL SYSTEM tbl. 15. at 35 [hereinafter BENCHMARK 1988] with SOUTII DAKOTA COURTS, 
STATE OF THE JUDICIARY & 1990 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SoUTH DAKOTA UNlnEQ JUDICIAL 
SYSTEMtbI.15.at35(Jan.I99J). 
163. Comptlre BENCHMARK 1988. Sllpra I10le 162. tbl. 15. at 35 wi,h SOUTH DAKOTA 
COURTS. STATE OF THE JUDICIARY & 1992 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SOU'll-I DAKOTA UNlnro 
JUDICIAL SYSTEM. Ibl. 15. at 43 (Jan. 1(93): see also Leller from Bloomberg 10 Kindl:. sllpm note 
144. 
164. Speech by Jeffry llIoomherg. supra nole 144. 
165 . Id. 
166. Id. 
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many local government officials anticipated. In this instance. the economy was 
primarily a casino economy, which the public generally considers 10 be one of the 
"harder" forms of gambling, as distinguished from a slate lottery. which is 
"softer." Even so, the time lags between the initiation of gambling and the large 
increases in the demand for local governmental services were definitely short and 
caught several government officials by surprise. 167 
Significantly, within the same two-year span, the Deadwood state attorney's 
office reported il had noticed that 3% to 5% of the population already appeared 10 
be on the way to becoming problem gamblers and compulsive gamblers. 168 This 
was a chi lling observation and a reminder thai the compulsive gambling popula-
!ion could form rapidly,I69 and if this phenomenon were in fact occurring, it 
would help explain the dramatic increases in the social and criminal problems 
reported by the state attorney's office.l7o 
Field research supports these observations. Fortunately, specific field 
research was being conducted in South Dakota and Iowa during relatively the 
same time frame. Given the strategic variables associated with state economies, 
the following results are not definite, bUI they support what socio-economic the-
ories would find in a developing gambling state, such as South Dakota. 
"One of the few available approaches to estimating the impact of gambling 
legalization on gambling problems in the general population is 10 contrast preva-
lence rales in geographically and demographically similar stales where gambling 
availability is different."l71 Although the stales obviously cannot be observed in 
a laboratory, a comparison of the states of South Dakota and Iowa may be one of 
the better examples because the strategic variables are more alike than in compar-
isons between most other states. "While this approach suggests the potential size 
of Ih e im-Raci of gambling legalization, it does not in any way prove such an 
impact." I 2 Given these constraints. it is still quite revealing to compare South 
Dakota and Iowa with regard to the prevalence of pathological gamblers pursuant 
to the South Oaks Gambling Screen.l13 As summarized by Dr. Rachel Volberg, 
President of Gemini Research: 
167. Id.;Noga,supranote 160,at I, 
I ti8. Speech by Jeffry Bloomberg, supra note 144. 
169 . Interestingly, there is some evidence that CasillO, racetrack, and sports gamblers do not 
become compulsive gamblers as quickly as some otncr categories of gamblers. "Slot machine 
addicts, pokcr machine addicts, lottery players and bingo addicts tend 10 ·bottom out' in less time 
than other types of gamblef$, usually within two 10 three years of starting to gamble on this panicu-
lar acti vity." LoRENZ, supra note 65, at 4. Because all of these categories were represented in the 
Deadwood scenarios, in addition to casino gambling, the nat ional data tends to suppon the obser-
vat ion of the development of a problem of compulsive gamblers within a two·year span. 
Funhermorc, because addiction to casino gambling generally occurs more s lowly than in the case 
of VLTs, Deadwood can probably anticipate higher percentages of the public to become addictcd in 
the futurc. See id. . 
170 . See supra fl()(CS 157-66 and accompanying text. 
171. Letter from Dr. Racncl Volberg. Presidcnt, Gemini Research. to Professor John Warren 
Kindt, Uni versity of Illinois 2 (Dec. 23, 1992) [ncreinafter Letter from Volberg to Kindt). 
172. Jd. 
173. The South Oaks Gambling Screen was developed 10 identify when persons became 
pathological gamblcrs. Henry R. Lesieur & Sheila B. Blume, The SQul1! Dab Gambling Screen 
74 Drake WI1' Revjew (Vol. 43 
As an ex.ample. we can compare the prevalence rales of problem gambling 
in Iowa and South Dakota. These two states are contiguous and their 
demographics are similar. The adult popu lation in both siaies is·predomi-
nantly Caucasian,I 1141 Similar proportions of the adult population in each 
slate are under the age of 30. high school graduates, unmarried, and have 
annual household incomes under $25,000.1 175) Analysis shows that lifetime 
gambling participation was 84% in Iowa in 1989 and 86% in Soulh Dakota 
in 1991. The available legal fonns of gambling in Iowa and Soulh Dakota 
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If horse racing is considered to be subsumed somewhat by its similarities to 
dog racing, then South Dakota has basically adopted pulltabs, casinos, and VL Ts 
between 1989 and 1991. Specifically, the VLTs began operating on October 21, 
1989. and the cas inos began operating shortly afler the VL Ts on November I, 
1989. "The lifetime prevalence rate of problem and probable pathological gam-
bling. as measured with the South Oaks Gambling Screen ... was 1.7% in Iowa 
and 2.8% in South Dakota."178 It is importan t to note that this field research 
reveals what socio-economic theorists would expect to find when extrapolating 
from Q[her less complete, tangential, or related field research. Specifically, 
"{t}hese findings suggest that the introduction of widespread legal gambling, 
including pulltabs, casinos and video lottery teoninals. was associated with a 1% 
increase in the prevalence rate of problem and probable pathological gambling 
over a 2-year period."t79 While these findings only suggest that the introduction 
of widespread legalized gambling caused a 1% incre,lsc in problem and patholog-
ical gamblers in the adult popUlation, the national statistics show that increases 
(1IIeSOGs): A New 1nl/mn/elll for the Identifica/ion of Paliwlogica/ Galnblu5, 144 AM . J. 
PsYCHIATRY 1184 (1987). 
174. The similarilY in adult popu lotions reduces one major variable. See CLOTfELTER & 
CooK. sUI"a note 58, at 95· 104. (Footnote odded). 
175. These similarities in populalion demographics funher reduce several major variables. 
!d. (Foolnote added). 
176. For case of companson, these categories have been placed in slightly differenl order 
from the origirml. Su Letter from Volbcrg to Kindt. $/IPI"(I note 171.;11 2. (Footnote added). 
177. Id. (emphasis added). 
178. !d. 
179. !d. 
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will in fact occ ur until they reac h between 1.5% and 5% of the population. ]80 
The only real debate is how long Ihis process will take. In Soulh Dakota. the 
increase of 1 % occurred during a dramatically short two-year period. This phe-
nomenon can be explained by South Dakota's introduction of VLTs. wh ich 
soc iologists widely regard as the "c rack-cocaine" of gambling addic tion,I81 
Furthermore. the clinical observations by the state attorney's office in Deadwood, 
South Dakota. support the results of this field research. 182 
Considering that the socia-economic costs to South Dakota for each compul-
sive gambler is conservatively estimated at $52,000 per yenr,IS3 a I % increase in 
an <\duh population of 500,000 wou ld result in 5000 new problem and probable 
pathological g.1mblers. This increase would cost South Dakota an added $260 
million over a two-year period. This decline in the quality of life, combined with 
similar drains on the state economy.l84 would undoubtedly be noticed by the 
electorate. 
The field research indicates that the adolescent popu lation shows prevalence 
rates of 4% to 6% for compulsive gambling. 'SS which is higher than the rates 
among the adu lt polulation. Because the adult population of Soulh Dakota was 
500.000 in 1991
' 
and the total population was approximate ly 700J)()()'87 
(ensuring that the correct census numbers are used for the same years),'88 the 
adolescent populalion probably const ituted about onc-third of the difference. or 
about 70.000. 
The legalized gambling interests argue that it is illegal for the teenage popu-
lation to gamble; therefore, the teenage populalion should not be included in 
Ihese calculations. Studies show, however, regardless of the laws prOhibiting 
teenage gambling. teenagers still gamble. Despite laws in Atlantic City restrict-
ing the casinos to persons twenty-one years and over."19 a survey of teenagers in 
an At lantic City high school revealed 64% of the teenagers had gambled in a 
casino, 21 % had visited casinos more than ten times, and 9% sti ll gambled at 
least once a week. l90 Studies between 1985 and 1987 ind icaled that 20% to 86% 
ISO. Suo t!.g .• [d.; BETTER GOV'T ASS·N. slIpra nOle 3. at 30 (reponing four slUdies wi th a 
rnnge between 1.7% to 4.5%): see ,,/so CLOTfELTER & COOK. supm note 58, at 124-25. 
181. Su LOR[NZ. supra note 58. at 4. "Sial machine addicts las well:lS1 poker machine 
addicts ... tend to 'bottom out' in less time than Olhcr types of gamblers, usually withm two /0 
rllru year.f of starting to gamble on Ihis p,1l1ieular activity." Id. (emphasis added). 
182. Speech by Jeffry Bloomberg, sit/,m note 144. 
183. BEITER GOV'T ASS'N. sliwa nOle 3. at 14. 
184. /d. at 14·17. 
185. The widely-accepled 4% to 6% range for compulsivc gambling among the It!enage 
poputation is repon~ by Dr. Durand Jacobs of the Lorna linda University M~kal School. The 
overall range of prevalence rau=s for the teenage population is 4% to 15%. Suo e.g. itl. at 30. 
186. St!f! ;,ifm Appendi:o;, Table 2. 
187. CF.J.lSUS IJUIU,; .... U. U.S . DCP'T OF COMMERCE, 1990 CENSUS, reprinted ill THE WORLD 
AtMANAC & BOOK OF FACTS 389 (1992). 
188. Of course, refining the popu lation demographics for the same years enhances the accu-
racy of the resulls. From u strategic governmental perspective. however. the approximations urc 
probably accurate cnough given the cost .md benefits of funher refining lhe data. 
189. Ill. ST .... TE PoLICE. supra note 4. at 15. 
190. ftI. (reporting the results ofa 1985 study by Arcuri. Lester, & Smith). 
, -
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of high school student s had gambled for money within the previous year.l91 
Studies between 1985 and 1987 also revealed that 4% to 32% of high school stll-
dents in different studies (32% in New Jersey) reported gambling weekly or more 
oflen,I92 These studies and others l93 directly and indirect ly support the widely 
accepted prevalence rates that 4% to 6% of the teenage population gamble 
compulsively.l9.1 
Accordingly. these higher prevalence rates among the teenage population 
support the extrapolation of the prevalence rates among the adult population into 
the rest of the populati on. From a strategic governmental perspective. these 
extrapolations constitute figures that are quile representative of the prob lems. 
given the extensive research costs and time constraints associated with furthe r 
refini ng the data. Specifically, the South DakOla adult population of approxi-
mately 500,000 would indicate that a I % increase in the prevalence rate of 
problem-probable pathological gambler); would cost $260 million. By compari-
son. the teenage prevalence rates would be approximately two to three times the 
adult rates, that is. at least 4% to 6% for teenagers nationwide compared to 2.8% 
for adults in South Dakota. Therefore. the "increase" in the prevalence rate 
among teenagers could be extrapolated at approximately two to three ti mes the 
increase in the adult prevalence rates. The Connecticut prevalence rate of 15% 
for teenagers who are problem gamblers indirectly supports this proposition.J!15 
The result is that the rate of increase among teenagers yie lds approximately the 
same result as extrapolating the adult increase of I % to include the entire popula-
tion of South Dakota. Added to $260 million per year in costs for the South 
Dakota adult population is an approximately 2.5% increase in the teenage popu-
lation of 70.000. This increase equals 1750 teenagers multiplied by $52,000 per 
year for an additional cost to South Dakota of approximately $91 million per 
year. The total of $341 million per year is approximately the same as taking the 
increase in the adult population of I %, multiplying that increase by the overall 
population of 700,000. and multiplying the resultant 7000 by the costs of $52.000 
per year, which equals $364 million per year. 
From a strateg ic governmental perspective, the slight differences between the 
$341 million and $364 million estimates are probably not worth the added costs 
of refining the numbers. In either case. the costs to the state are still ex tremely 
large. particularly when compared to the projected tax revenues-approximately 
$50 million in the case of South Dakota. 
This dramatic socio-economic impact perhaps explains why the November 
1992 ballot in South Dakota reflected a referendum question that was designed to 
191. BElTER GOV'T ASS·N. sl/pra nrue]. at 2]. 
192. Id. at 26. 
193. See ge"erally Ill. STAn: POLICE, supra note 4, al 15; ue al.Jo BETTI:R GoV'T ASS·N. 
supra note 3. at 21-30. 
194. See supra notes 117. 185 and accompanying tex t. 
195 . BElTER Gov'T ASS'N. Jrlpr(l note 3. at 30. app. G (reporting data from the Connecticut 
Council on Compulsive Gambling. Hamden. Connecticut). 
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ban VL TS,I96 Although this referendum question failed,197 the mere fact that 
within less Ihan one year the pel it ion drive was mounted and successfully placed 
the question on the November ballot demonstrated that a substantial number of 
the electorate was alert to the economic negatives of VLTs. 
IV. HOW LEGALIZED GAMBLING INTERESTS "PEG" THE TEN PERCENT 
MARKET CREAM OF THE GAMBLING PUBLIC 
Regardless of these considerations. the most shocking stat istic is that 
although the number of compulsive gamblers is between 1.5% and 5% of the 
population in states with legalized gambling. 198 the number of PEGs is approxi-
mately 10% of the population, even in those states ';lal have only state 
lotleries. l 9<l PEGs are gamblers who are in the process of becoming problem or 
probable compulsive gamblers. or who are already compulsive gamblers. 
Therefore, even if the percentages of compulsive gamblers are challenged as 
being incon'ect, the compulsive gambling statistics are confirmed by, and are 
subsumed in, the fact that 10% of the population 200 consists of PEGs in states 
with legalized gambling.2o, This observation is supported by studies that 
"strongly suggest that the introduction of a state lottery brings a large fraction of 
the adult population into commercial gambling."2tl2 
Nationwide, PEGs lose an average of approximately $900 annually.203 In 
Tllinois. for example, PEGs gamble and lose approximately 13. 1 %2().l more dollars 
than the national average- that is, approximately $10 18 per year per Illinois 
PEG. If the population is conservatively estimated at 10 million, then 10%. or I 
million people in Illinois, are gambling approximately $1 billion. 205 This market-
ing group constitutes the primary "target group" or is "pegged" for the efforts of 
all gambl ing interests. Another 42% of the public gamble rec reat ionally 
(approximately $500 million in Illinois), although the rest of the public (4&%) do 
not gamble at all.206 
196 . Richard Jameson. Speech before the South D<lkota Citizens Forum Against Video· 
Louery Tenninals (Oct. 18. (992). 
197. The vote to keep VLTs was 205.640 (62.8%); the vote against VLTs was 121.848 
(37.2%). Rose. Sllpra note 143 , at I. 
198. Se,' SII{Jr<I notes 102·06 and accompanying lext. These pcKcntages of CEGs were 
paralleled by percentages in a 1992 Gallup poll, The poll indicat .. -d th<lt 5% of the public <Idmitk-d 
"gmnbling caused family problems" and 7% enjoyed gnmbling "a lot." NEOWS SEORVICEO 12-16-92. 
slipra nOle 96. al 1·3. 
199 . See CLOTFELTER & COOK. slIpra note 58, at 92-94. In terestingly, 10% of the public in 
a 1992 poll admilted Ihey "gamble 100 much." NEWS SERVICE 12·16·92. SlIfJrtI note %. at 3. 
200. See CLOTFELTER & COOK. slIl'ra nole 58, at 92·94. 
201. Id. at 104·05. 
202. Id. at 104. 
203. Seeid. at 26-27. 
204. See id. 
205. These percenlages arc renceled in the Illinois Siale IOllery mnnbers o f approximalely 
$1.5 billion in sales per year. See ILL. 1992 BUDGET, .SIIpm note 125. al 64·65. Stale lotlery ligures 
ure used because there are fewer variables. the data is more strnightrorward. und Ihe data is less 
subject to reporting errors. 
206, CLOlT'ELTER & COOK, SIIpnl note 58. at 93, 
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According to Thomas Grey, Director of Legislative Affairs for the lIlinois 
Church Action on Alcohol Problems (ILLCAAP), persons do not have to be 
"rocket scientists"207 10 understand that gambling activities have large negative 
impacts on society and the economy. In fact. gambling activities are highly 
negative to the welfare of the strategic economy and traditional pre-existing busi-
nesses. The socia-economic numbers support what many people instinctively 
realize: gambling activities are inherently parasitic, feeding on and causing 
hunnful side effects to portions of the population in interstate. state. and local 
economies. Because populations are economically interrelated, the soc ia-eco-
nomic costs eventually span those population bases directly and indirectly 
associated with legalized gambling activities. In thi s regard. gambling is differ-
ent from other business endeavors. 
V. CLAIMS OF UNFAIR COMPETmVE ADVANTAGES ENJOYED BY 
LEGALIZED GAMBLING ORGANIZATIONS 
Traditional businesses are at a competitive disadvantage when pitied against 
legalized gambling interests. It is difficult enough for one business 10 meet its 
normal competilion. but it is extremely difficult to compete for consumer dollars 
with gambling enterprises Ihal are advertising a well-recognized addictive activ-
ity.208 Furthermore, "[g]ambling is not a fundamenlal righl."209 According 10 
economics professor Earl Grinols of the University of llIinois, gambling "is a 
state-regulated monopoly allowed for the convenience of the slale,"210 and 
according to sociology professor Vicki Abt of Pennsylvania State University, 
Casinos cOr:lpcle 100 well in a capitalistic society. Land values are inflated 
by speculation; skyrocketing real estate taxes overwhelm local residents 
who do not sell out 10 speculators; and existing institutions and recreation 
facilities cannot match the attraction and economic clout of the casinos.211 
Furthermore, consideration needs to be given to the economic impact on the 
individual. "rn the case of slate lotteries, the vast majority of those who play will 
never see a return on their investment; in their case, the lotteries feed illusions. 
not dreams."212 
207. Thomas Grcy, Dir. Legis. Affairs for Illinois Church Action on Alcohol Problems. 
Speech before the Seminar on Gambling Issues in Illinois (May 20, 1992): see The 700 Club 
(television broadcast. Oct. I, 1992) (interview with Thomas Grey. Dir. Legis. Affairs for Il linois 
Church Action on Alcohol Problems). 
208 . In 1979, the World Heal th Organi13tion officially recognized pathological gambling as 
an addiction. 
209. Grinols, Champaign Repon, slI/,ra note 114, a13. 
210. /d. 
211. Vicki Abt.ls Gamblillg Fiscally ReS(MCwble? CHI. TRm .. luly 21. 1990. § J. at II. 
212. (d. 
1994J Legalized Gambliflg 79 
In addition, the guaranteed geographic market areas allowed in some slates, 
such as in Illinois for both riverboat gamhli ng21J and off·track belling pariors,214 
are slowly being recognized by traditional businesses as constituting unfair com-
petitive advantages legally granted by state governments to the gambling 
organizations.m Furthennore, the legalized gambling interests apparently wish 
to avoid competition, particularly between different gambling organizations or 
between spec ialized gambling markets. One of the sponsors of the $2 billion 
casino complex which was proposed for Chicago, President J. Terrence Lanni of 
Caesars World, reportedly indicated in an attempt to gai n legislative approval for 
the complex, "We would give up the right to operate a sports parlor in the state of 
lll inois."216 
We would offer that to the racing industry to operate in our facility 
for their benefit, al/d we would 1101 compele with tltem. We would turn that 
over to them, as we would the race book, both in thc casino complcx and 
anywhere else in Illinois .... It certainly can be big money. We do very 
well in race and spons books in Nevada.217 
Traditional businesses resent that they must compete with the gambling 
interests not just for the so·called "entertai nment dollar" or "recreational dollar," 
but for other consumer dollars as well. Generally, traditional businesses were 
slow to recognize the way in which legal ized gambling organizations captured 
dollars from across the entire spectrum of the various consumer markets. 
Although Ihese businesses were not naive, the ban on legalized gambling for 
1110st of the twentieth century meant that they had never operated in a gambling 
environment. Therefore, the manifestations and promises of the gambling inter· 
ests had to be taken at face value-although the elected government officials who 
cavalierly allowed or endorsed legalized gambling should have done their home· 
work. In particular, United States Senator Paul Simon of Illinois criticized and 
chastised local and slate officials for their sholtsightedness.218 
2 13. Su ILLINOIS Ec01'~. & FISCAL.CmH,1'N, WAGERING IN ILLINOIS 49 (1992) [hereinaftcr 
ILL EcoN. COMM'N]. 
2 14. M. al 26. 
215 . See gel/emily it!. at 52; EMI SI. UJlfiJ Loses Ca.~il/o Gl/arO/lftt', NEWS-GAZe"" 
(Champaign. IIl. ), May 8. 1992. ~t AS [hercillufter CasillO Glwrwlleel. 
Cook CounlY Judge Edwin M . Berman ruled ... Ihat it was UllconSlilUlionat 
for the stale to guaranlcc Easl 51. Louis a license when it wrole Icgislution on 
!1o:uing casinos. 
Ilcrman said the Gaming Uoard may nOl consider thai portion of the law bul 
could award a license 10 EaSI SI. Louis b.'\Sed on oliler guidelines in the law. 
Id. Critics of legalized gambling claim that this scenario ellemplifies the silliness of tile litigation 
and legistauvc efforts Ihat are based on fnutty economic presumptions. &e Thomas Grey, Address 
Ultlle National Anti-Gambling Conference (May 14. 1994). 
2 16. Fran Spielman, CasillO VI/illll/lllln, CHI. SUN·TIMES, July 10, 1992, at 1.34. 
217. Id. (quoting Caesars World Presldenl J. Terrence Lanni) (emphasis added). 
218. 138 CONGo REC. S\87 (daily cd. Jan. 22, 1992) (statement of Sen. Simon); see 
lmt'rvicw with U.S. Senator Pau l Sinton, WMAQ·AM, Chicago, Ill. , June 19, 1992; SimOI/ Vrgl'.~ 
C(IIl liulI, mpm nOli:: 52. 
,-
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The public slowly began to recognize the extent and impacts of these pro-
tecled competi tive advantages and the word "monopoly" began to appear in the 
press,219 even by supponers of the legalized gambling imerests.220 These sup-
porters suggested that there was "no reason the stale should protect sancrioned 
monopolies suc h as the lonery and horse tracks or quasi-private off-track betting 
parlors and gambling boals and other favored enterprises."nJ Furthermore, the 
supporters twisted the argument that these monopolies should not be legalized 
into the argument that they should be legalized, but regulated by the state to pro-
tect the public. Those regulations, however, were often dmfled by the gambling 
interests themselves. 222 Under the guise of protecting the public, these interests 
allegedly included regulatory elements that guarantee allegedly unfair competi-
tive advantages to the gambling organizations.223 
In addition, the marketing conducted by gambling enterprises sells hope,224 
and thereby cuts across atl spectrums of consumer spending. Gambling interests 
are competing not just for the consumer's "entertainment dollar" as they claim, 
but for all consumer dollars, inc luding the savings dollars. Once discretionary 
income is exhausted, 10% of the public will draw on their savings accounts 
(including dollars normally directed to mortgage principal, interest, real estate 
taxes, and homeowners' in surance). Subsumed in this 10% are the 1.5% to 5% 
of the public who are compulsive gamblers and will exhaust an average of 
$ 15,000 per yearns over a maximum fifteen-year period before "bottoming 
OUI."226 In addition, compulsive gamblers also go into debt an average of 
$80,000 to finance their compulsive gambling.227 
219. See. e.g .. Editorial. u:gali~e CasillO Gamblillg. DECAnJR HERALD& REV. (111.), Apr. 
21. 1992. (It 2 [hereinafter Legalize Casino Gambling]. 
220. It/. 
221. Id. (emphasis addcd). 
222. For c)!';ampte, concerning the t992 proposed casino compte)!'; for Chicago, Mayor 
Richard Daley's "mayoral allies confided lm the Chicago Sun-Times] that a casino bill [was] being 
drafted by City 1'1<111 for introduction [to the Illinois state legislature's 1992 spring session]," Fran 
Spielman, Daley Blasls Crime f>allel, CHI. SUN-TIMES,June 19, 1992. at 3. 
223. See, e.g .. ILL. EcON. COl>tM ·N, supra note 213, at 52. See generally Legali~e CasillO 
Gambling, slIpra note 219. at 2. 
224. See gf'lterafly CLOTfELTER & COOK, Sf/pm nOle 58. 
225. See GAMllLtNG ADDICTION IN MARVLAND, supra note 65, at 156. 
226. It/. 
227, hi. at 2. 
Researchers have TI:portcd on different rates of indebtedness of pathological 
gmnblers in treatment. The mean gambling-relnted debt (excluding nuto loans, 
mortgages, and other " legitimate·' debl) of individuals in treatmem ranges from 
$53.350 to $92.000. Female Gamblers Anonymous (GA) members have a 
lower level of gambling reiated debt averaging almost $15.000. This is only 
the debt that they accumulale and does nOI include the debt they payoff. For 
an estimated IS percenl of males and 8 percent of females in studies of treat-
ment samples and members of Gnmblers Anonymous. this eventually led to 
bankruptcy. 
Lesieur, Compu/siw Gambling, ,wpra note 66, at 44 (citations omitted). During a twenty-year 
period in New Jersey, ·'over $5 14 million dollars was accumulatct.l in debt by compulsive gamblers 
in Ihat state alone pI:"/" yew."· Iii. at 44·45 . As a function of stale popUlation. this parallels the 
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Over a seven-year period, the theoretical loss to a population base of ten mil-
lion people mnges from $28 to $93 billion. 228 Most of these dollars are lost to the 
economy of the population base because the dollars are spent on gambling 
activities instead of on consumer goods and services. Real resources are shifted 
out of traditional goods and services. Once again, the time period during which 
this phenomenon occurs is difficuh (0 calculate. The evidence from Deadwood, 
South Dakota suggests. however, that the "hard forms" of gambling associated 
with casino gambling constitute a virulent catalyst to this phenomenon, because 
3% to 5% problem and pathological gamblers had begun to manifest themselves 
in Deadwooo within a two-year period.m Additionally. video gambling has been 
commonly known to addict gamblers within a one-year period or less; hence. 
sociologists and medical communities widely refer to video-gambling as the 
"crack-cocaine" of gambling addiction.2JO 
VI. THE INVALiD ARGUMENT OF LEGALIZING GMABLING ACfIVITIES TO 
CAPTURE TAXES FROM PRE-EXISTING ILLEGAL GAMBLING 
According to sociology professor Vicki Abt. "the fiscal respectability of 
legalized gambling is largely a sham."2~1 
The myth [of legalized gambling] also presumes that legalization, rather 
than enforcement of anti-gambling laws, will eliminate the seamier, under-
ground forms of gambling, thus directing proceeds into the right hands. 
However, it is il!ogical to assume that either casinos or lotteries will divert a 
substantial amount of exisling wagering from illegal channels. 232 
Despite the myth that legalizing gambling activities captures taxes from pre-
exist ing illegal gambling, a 1992 Gallup polJ suggests that 61 % of the public still 
believe it, while 38% do not. 23J 
formula of the range to be expected in Ncw Jersey. The calculation is: $80.000115 ycars x 1.5% x 
(Slate population) = $5,333/ycar x 1.5% x (7.7 million) = $616 million/ycar. 
228. Compulsive gamblers will cvcntually pump their discretionary asset base (over an 
average seven-year period) and their credit base into gambling pursuant to the following formula: 
($ I 5.CK>O x 7 years) (1.5-5% x poPldation base) + $80,000 (1.5-5% x population base) = total pro-
jected loss \0 economy of the population base. 
In a populalion base of 10 million, this formula yields parameters of $16 billion \0 $53 billion 
plus $12 billion 10 $40 billion, which equals $28 billion 10 $93 billion. See generally GAMBLING 
ADOlcnON IN MARYLAND, mpra nOle 65, at 59-61, 156. 
229. See supra nOles 168-70, 178-82 and accompanying text. 
230. A scenario similar to the Deadwood scenario might also explain the large returns gen-
erated by the Excalibur Hotel in Las Vegas from 1990 to 1991. James Coates, Vegas' Tip 10 
Chicago: CasillO is Family FlUl, CHI. TRm., Apr. 10, 1992, § I, at I. 10. 
231. Ab!, mpra nole 21 1, at II; see also VICKI ABT ET AL., THE BUSINESS OF RtSK: 
COMMERCIAL GAMBLING IN MAINSTREAM AMERICA (1985). 
232 . Abt, supra note 211. at II. 
233 . NEWS SERVICE 12-5-92, supra note 100, at 2. 
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Theoretically, in a gambling-free stale of ten million •. 77% of the population 
are compulsive gamblers who spend $1.15 billion on illegal gambling. Once 
gambling is legalized, this number doubles (under the minimum doubling rule) [0 
approximately $2.25 billion (and could go as high as $7.5 billion). As a case 
example, IlIinois's numbers parallel what might be expected; specifically. about 
$2 billion bel legally in Illinois. Conservatively, the $1.1 billion could equal 
65% of the legal wager (if only compulsive gamblers are considered and not 
problem gamblers). Therefore, the state lottery "handle" or gross should be $1.1 
billion (65%) + $,6 billion (35%) = $1.7 billion. The actual 1992 Illinois handle 
for the state lottery was $1.6 billion}34 The small difference (from a strategic 
perspective) can be explained by the fact that other foons of legalized gambling 
were rapidly developing in Illinois during 1992. It should be noted that the $1.15 
billion in illegal gambling mayor may not have been "captured" somewhat by 
the legalization of gambling. 
Gambling is generally legalized for the purpose of capturing tax revenues, 
but the pre-existing illegal gambling dollars have a tendency to go to harder 
foons of gambling that are usually still illegal for the simple marketing reasons 
that the odds are better and the "thrill factor" is greater Merely legalizing some 
foons of gambling will not induce megal gamblers to convert en masse to legal-
ized gambling. To pre-existing illegal gamblers, the thrill of gambling is lost 
somewhat by legalized gambling, and therefore, the propensity of illegal gam-
blers is strongly toward cominued illegal gambling. If the illegal gambling 
market was moving en masse into legalized gambling, the total handle, or gross, 
on a 1992 population base of 10 million. such as in Illinois, would be [$15,000 x 
1.5% x (state population)] 1.65 = $3.5 billion, Illinois's approximately $1.6 bil-
lion bel in the state lottery and $,8 billion in other legalized gambling supports 
the proposition that the illegal gambling market is still much the same as it has 
always been. What the legalization of gambling really accomplishes is to seduce 
a whole new market segment of the public into gambling activities.m Therefore, 
legalizing gambling probably does little or nothing to capture and tax the illegal 
gambling market. 
Although these calculations are largely theoretical, they must necessarily be 
so because it is virtually impossible to conduct research in the area of illegal 
gambling activities. There is no authoritative evidence, however, showing that 
illegal gambling activities are captured or taxed by legalizing gambling activities, 
Conversely, the landmark United Stales Commission on the Review of the 
Nalional Policy Toward Gambling reported in 1976 that there was "some evi-
dence Ihat the exislence of gambling sanctioned, licensed, or run by the various 
States~and Ihe attendant publicity-tends to increase citizen participation in 
illegal as well as legal gambling,"236 More conclusively, in 1988 the New Jersey 
Governor's Advisory Commission on Gambling "heard from law enforcement 
officials in New Jersey who contended[ed) that legalized gaming has not only 
234. ILUNOIS EcON. COMM'N, supra nOie 213, at 3, 71, 
235. CLOTFELTER & COOK, supra note 58, at 104-06; see Lesieur, Compu/siw:_Gambling. 
supra nole 66, at 43, 
236. U,S, COMM'NON GAMBLING, supra note 104, al49 (emphasis added), 
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failed to curb illegal gambling but in fact has been conducive to its growth."237 
The Commission ultimately concluded that legalized gambling did not decrease 
the illegal gambling in New Jersey.nll 
Once in full operation, the legalized gambling enterprises will drain a mini~ 
mum of $2.25 billion pef year out of a population base of 10 million.239 Almost 
all of these gambling dollars will continue in gambling activities. Without 
legalized gambling. approximately 50% of that $2.25 billion (or SI.1 billion)24Q 
would be spent annually in the regu lnr economy on services and on durable and 
nondurable goods-which would act as a positive multiplier. generate more 
orders for durable and nondurable goods, and creale more service jobs and pro -
duction jobs. These numbers do not include the other 42% of the public who wi ll 
gamble. but gamble only 35% percent of the ga mbling dollars,w while the 10% 
PEGs gamble 65% of the gambling dollars.242 
VII, AN OVERVIEW OF THE MEGAPROFITS STRATEGIES OF THE 
LEGALIZED GAMBLING ORGANIZATIONS 
When gambling organizations capture the 10% PEGs. the market cream. the 
return on investment that those gambling organizations can expect is several 
times what a nonnal corpomtion or business could expect. Thc enormous profit 
margin to be anticipated explains why (unlike another S2 billion proposal from , 
for example, a department store chain) the sponsors of the proposed $2 billion 
Chicago gambling complex- Hilton Hotels. Caesars World. and Circus Circus-
appeared to be willing 10 pay up front for all of the Chicago land and infrastruc-
ture needed for 'the complex and not pressure for conccssions in these areas. 
Such a policy would help assure that the current landowners and nearby Chicago 
businesses would be supportive of the proposal. The sponso rs of the casino 
complex, however, wanted a 50% tax reduction (from 20% down to 10%)243 that 
would transfer the eosts away from Chicago and La the Ill inois taxpayers. The 
"leaked" public relations documents of the sponsors of the casino complex 
indicated they were highly confident in their abilit), 10 red uce any potential state 
and local taxes by 50%,24~ Arguably, the sponsors also pressured for a partial 
five-year tax waiver because they knew that most of their monies would be made 
during the first five ye:\rs. 
237. N.J. GOVERNOR'S Aov. COMM'N ON GAMBLIr'>'G. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 19 
(1988). 
238. /d. 
239. The basic calculalion is: 51 5.ooo/year x 1.5% x (state poPll lnt ion) "" S2.25 billion. 
240. TIle basic calculation is: 515,OOO/year x (1.5% - ,77%) x (5t~te popul~tion) = Sl.l 
billion, 
241. See CLOTFaTER & Coolcsupra notc 58, at 92·94 . 
242. /d. 
243. BElTER GOV'T ASS'N. SlIp r (1 notr: 3. app. Q. a124. 
244. rd. The pre-cxisting lIlA ratr: was 20%, According 10 tile public relations finn working 
for the ~ponsors of Ihe casino complex. "those [cili7.cns] who pcrsislccJ in arguing lht unf;Jirncss of 
a 10% vs. 20% rale of taxation were dis~nsed with by {'ommcnts ~ur:h a~ ... 'Would you r~thcr 
have 10% ofsomelhing Ihan 20% of nothing?''' !d. 
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The enormous profits (and returns on investment) generated during the first 
five years14S made it a savvy strategy for the sponsors of the casino complex to 
lobby for lax concessions.246 Relevant examples of these large profits were 
common: 
Circos Circus opened the Excalibur lin Las Vegas] in 1990. adding 
another 4,000 hotel rooms in a project thaI made the Excalibur the biggest 
hotel in the United States. (In 1991] the company st unned market analYSIS 
by announcing it had already paid off the Eltcalibur mortgage from operat-
ing revenucs.247 
It is astounding for any business to be able to pay its entire mortgage in less 
than two years. A fortiori, it is almost unbel ievable that the source of the funds 
was operating revenues , which by definition includes net profits, the mortgoge 
amount, and oil other expenses. By comparison, traditional businesses are quite 
satisfied if they make an annual 5% to 10% " return on investmcnl." 
Accordingly, it is remarkable for an organization, such as the Excalibur, to make 
over a 100% return on investment over a shon period of lime (especially if Ihal 
return was over a one [0 two year period). 
The megaprofits expected to be generated during the first five years of 
operation explains why the sponsors of the Chicago casino complex wanted a 
permanent 50% tax reduction from 20% to 10% (or even 7.7%)m-perhaps 
combined with a partial five-year tax waiver. The stale of Illinois could hypo-
thetically raise the tax rate from 20% to 50% with no tax waivers, and it would 
sti ll be profitable for any sponsors of a potential casino complex to come 10 
C hi cago, particularly because they would be the first large casino-style gambling 
to tap the 10% market of PEGs and newly generated compul sive gamblers. 
Of course, the key for the gambling organizalion is 10 conlrol that 10% of Ihe 
market. This 10% prime market explains why gambling interests do not like 10 
compete with each other. For example, the off-track belting parlors and the 
ri verboats in minois lobbied incessantly for, and received, specified geographic 
markets. 249 This phenomenon also explains why gambling interests are 
extremely eager to eslablish themselves quickly in areas where there are no legal-
ized gambling enterprises already-that is, they wish to skim the cream off the 
top of the market, which consists of the 52% of Ihe public who will gamble, but 
especially the 10% PEGs (included in the 52% 10Ial) . If the gambling enterprise 
245. The panial or total waiver o f taxes for five years is a common strategy of gambling 
organizations, and it has ~n remarkably successful. For examples of the off-track belling orgam-
zations' use of fiye-year lax waiyers in Danyille and Vermilion County, Illinois, see supra note 3 
and accompanying text. 
tn Fort Madison. Iowa. the riyerboatlefl after a few momhs, leaying the city with a IS-year. 
$2.2 million tax bond obligation. Petroski & Fuson, supra note 3, 8t 2. John Pick. City Manager of 
Fort Madison. stated, " I think people in town wilt definitely feel betrayed." Id. 
246. Srr Petroski & Fuson. sllpra note 3, at 2. 
247. Coates, supra nou: 230. at 10. 
248. Srr PROPOSED GAMING. supra note 8, at 270·71. 
249. Su ILLINOIS GAMING BOARD. ANNUAL REPORT AND WAGERING STUDY t99l, app. 0 
(illustrating the geographic markets for minois riverboats). 
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cannot be the first legalized gambling activity into a given geographic market 
area, then it wants to be the hardest form of gambling in that area because gam-
bling dollars (especially the 10% PEGs) tend to migrate from the softer forms of 
gambling to the more thrilling or harder ronns. Theoretically. the normal pro-
gression in which the dollars will move is from the state lottery to: 
I. race tracks (both dog and horse tracks); 
2. off-track belling pariors (because they take the betting to the 
geograph ic markets instead of wailing for the gamblers to come to 
the tracks); 
3. riverboat gambling (if geography permits); 
4. land-based casino gambling; 
5. video-machine gambling; and 
6. harder and more accessible forms of gambJing.250 
Gambling interests must continually expand, provide greater thrills, or otherwise 
gel harder forms of gambling to keep attracting players. More and more market-
ing gimmicks, including so-called "family en[ertainment centers," must 
continually be used to lure people temporarily back into a softer form of gam-
bling. Therefore. a gambling organization wants to be first into a pristine 
geographic market and wants a guaranteed geographic market so there is no other 
gambling competition. If these conditions are not possible, the gambling organi-
zation wants to be the hardest form of gambling in its own geographic market. 
VIII. A SUMMARY OF THE UNIQUE SOCIAL COSTS ACCOMPANYING 
LEGALIZED GAMBLING ACTIVITIES 
Unlike any other type of business activity, there are many social costs thal 
invariably accompany the introduction of legalized gambling enterprises into a 
pre-existing economy. In addition to the socio-economic costs that have already 
been discussed, there exist many other costs that are in the initial stages of being 
identified and studied. For example, once all of their assets and credit have been 
drained into gambling activities, compulsive gamblers are tempted to engage in 
embezzlement or other illegal activities to finance their habits,251 and approxi-
mate ly 20% of compulsive gamblers attempt suicide.m Studies indicate that 
15% to 25% of all compulsive gamblers have attempted suicide, which is five to 
ten times higher than the percentage for the general popu lation.253 
250. See. gel/emf/y, Richard Thalheimer. An Analysis of the Impact of Intra· State Intenr:lck 
Wagering. a State Lottery and Casino Gambling on Parimutuel Horse Raee Wagering: New 
Jersey-An Expanded Analysis (School of Bus., Univ. Louisville) (highlighting the movement of 
gambling dollars from horse racing to casinos). 
251 LORENZ.SII11H1 note 65, at 4. 6-7. 
252 See Lesieur, ComplliJiw> Gambling, supro note 66, at 46. The suicide rntes of com-
pulsive gamblers are in the range of 11% to 24%. Between 11% and 14% of the spouses of 
compulsive gamblers auempt to commit suicide. which is "three times higher than the reponed rate 
of suicide attempts 10 the general population." /d. 
253. GAMBLING ADDICTION IN MARYLAND. supra note 65, at 27 (25%); BElTER GOV'T 
ASS'N , supra note 3. at 20 (15% to 20%); Lesieur. Compulsiv~ Gambling. supra note 66. at 45 
(ISo/(: to 24%). 
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The negative financial and sociological impacts on family members, friends, 
and others. between seven and seventeen people per compulsive gambler, are 
enormous and must be borne by charities. social-welfare organizations, and fed-
eral, state, and local governments . Aside from the asset losses or rehabilitative 
costs, each compulsive gambler is estimated to cost society at least $45,000 per 
year.2S4 
Legalized gambling has often been described as a black hole of economics, 2S~ 
which begins by slowly draining the financial viability out of communities and 
then picking up speed as the dollars disappear. Similarly, it should not be 
surprising that many charities have identified the 10% PEGs as a "tithe of 
people" being sacrificed to the idols of gambling.2S6 In Nevada, the 5% of the 
public who appear to be compulsive gamblers plus the 5% who are in the process 
of becoming compulsive gamblers2s7 support this contention. 
254. GAMBLING ADDICTION IN MARY LAND, supra nOie 65, at 2 ($30,(X)(} per year in 
embezzled and !loosed dollars plus $15,000 per year in lost work productivity). 
255. See generally Sicwcrs, sUIJra note 150. 
256. See Bishop R. Sheldon Duecker. Address at the National Anti-Gambling Conference 
(May 13, 1994); see also ALTA. GAMING, supra note 96, at 18. 
257. From a business-economic perspective, the CEG is basically the same as the pathologi-
cal gambler. The PEGs, however. consist of the 10% of the public who lose 65% (or by some 
estimates 50% to 90%) of the legalized gambling dollars. The PEG category subsumes the CEG 
category. Sociologists, psychiatrists, and psychologists should not interchange or confuse their cat-
egory of problem gambler with the problem economic gambler. The PEG 10% category subsumes 
the categories of the pathological gambler, the probable pathological gambler, the possible patho-
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Table 1 
Increased Crime After the Advent of Casino GamblingUS 





.l.2.8..6.26O .l.2.8l261 l2l!ll'" l2l!2'" l22!l'" l22.l'" 
Class 2 
MisdemeanorsU1 3997 3878 3683 3758 4325 4279 
Class 1 
Misdemeanors268 629 591 483 507 569 685 






258 . These increased crime statistics might be explained in pan by increases in the num· 
bers or types of persons allrncted to the communit)' with casino gambling. Su Speech by Jeffry 
Bloomberg. suprn note 144. This table is modified from a table contained in Letter from Bloom-
berg to Kindt. supm note 144. 
259. Source: South Dakota SupremeCoun annual repons. 
260. BENCH MARK 1986: ANNU .... L REPOMT OF THE SOUTH DAKOTA UNIFIED JuOICIAL 
SYSTEM Ibl. 15. III 37. 
261. BENCHMARK 1987: ANNUAL R EPORT OF THE SOllTH DAKOTA UNIFIED JUDICIAL 
Sy~ tbl. 15,3135. 
262. BENCHMARK 1988: ANNUA L REPORT OF THE SOUTH DAKOTA UNI~lFJ) JUDICIAL 
SYSTEM Ibl. 15. a115. 
263. BENCHMARK 1989: ANNUA L REPORT OF THE SOUTH DAKOTA UNIFIED JUOICIAL 
SYSl·I:.M rb l. 15. al 35. 
264. SOUTH DAKOTA COURTS, STATE Of TIlE JUOICIARY & 1990 ANNUAL REPORT Of nlE 
Sourn DAKOTA UNIfiED JUDICIAL SYSTEM [bl. 15. al 35 (Jan. 1991). 
265. SOUTH DAKOTA COURTS, STATE OF nlE JUDICIARY & 1991 ANNUAL REPORTOFnlE 
Soonl DAKOTA UNlnw JUDICIAL SYSTEM [bl. 15. al39 (Jan. 1992). 
266. SoUTH DAKOTA COURn, STATEOFTHE JUOICIARY & 1992 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE 
Sourn DAKOTA UNIfiED JUDICIALSySTI:M 1bl. 15. at 43 (Jan. 1993). 
267. "Class 2 Misdemeanors" include insufficient funds checks. "[T[he bulk of the 
increase fro m 1989 10 1992 .•. [ap~ars to be l a result of increased bad c~ck prosecutions." 
Letter from Bloomberg to Kindt. SI/pro nore 144. 
268 "Class 1 Misdemeanors" subsumes "simple assaul15 arw:l OWl's and il appears Ihat 
both calegories have incn:a.sed since 1988." fd. 
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Table 2 
Comparison of Prevalence Rales: 
Problem and Probable Pathological Gamblcrs269 
Prevalence Rate Sample 
Jurisdiction in Populatioo (%)210 [l;ll< Si<o Researcher(s) 
California271 4.1 -4.5 1990 1250 Jacobs 
Connecticut 6.3 1991 1000 Volberg 
Iowa 1.7 1989 750 Volbcrg 
Maryland 3.9 1988 750 Volberg/Steadman 
Massachusettes 4.4 1989 750 Volberg 
Minnesota 2.4 1990 1251 Laundergan. et al. 
Montana 3.6 1992 1020 Volbcrg 
New Brunswick 6,0 1992 800 Baseline 
New Jersey 4.2 1988 1000 Volbcrg/Stcadman 
New York 4.2 1986 1000 Volbcrg 
New Zeala nd 6.9 1991 4000 Abbou/Volberg 
North Dakota 3.5 1992 1517 Volberg 
Quebec 3.8 1989 1002 Ladouceur 
South Dakota 2.8 1992 1560 VOlberglStuefen 
Texas 4.8 1992 6308 Wallisch 
Washington 5.1 1992 1502 Volberg 
Adolescent Population 
(Under 18) 
California211 4.0 1985 843 Jacobs, et a1. 
Californ ia17 1 4.0 1987 257 Jacobs, et al. 
Connecticut27 1 15.0 1988 573 Steinberg 
New Jersey 5.7 1987 892 Lesieur/Klein 
Quebec 3.6 1988 1612 Ladouccur/Mireault 
Texas 12.4 1992 924 Wnllisch 
Virgini a21l 12.0 1987 212 Jacobs, et aJ. 
Washington 8.0 1993 1054 Volberg 
269. Source: Modified from ALTA. GAMING. supra nOie 96, at 18 ; su also Durand F. 
J~obs.lII~gallJnd Undrx:llmtnted: A Revit'" o/Tunage Gambling {/lid the Plight a/Children and 
Problem Gnmblers in Atntrica. in COMPULSIVE GAMBLING 252.256 (H . Shafrer, CI al . cds. 1989); 
TExAS COMM'N ALCOHOL & [)M UG AOUSE.GA~tOLING IN TEXAS 1. 4-5 (1993). 
270. Some o f these prevalcn~ rates II rc calcul~tcd fo r locali1.cd arelLS and may nm be 
representalive of the enlire populalion base of the jurisdiction . 
27 1. Jacobs. supra nOle 269. al 256·57 . The diasnostic cr iter ill and demographics 
between siudies vary somewhat. bUI Ihese numbers appear to be representative of the <:ri leria 
established pursuant to Ihe South Oaks Gambling Saeen for determ ining problem and probable 
pathological gambling. See Lesieur & Blume. SUfJf(I not<: 173. 
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Table 3 
Taxpayer Costs272 Formulas27J 
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Column 2 Column 3 Column 4 
After Gamblin~ Has Been l&ea1jzed 
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Ga mblers (1993}278 
.02 x State 
Population 
272. These taxpayer costs constitUle real costs to la""paycrs and Stille governments. To 
compensate for these costs, taxes musllhcoTelically be increased dollar for dollar. Bl'"Cause state 
governments are unlikely 10 wise taxes dollar for dollar, the al ternatives are (I) to divert dollars 
from education to address Ihe increased social·welfare and crime costs, (2) to transfer many of 
these costs to "charitable organi2Utions," (3) 10 adjust 10 a decline in the pre.eJl:isting '"quality of 
life" values, (4) to ra ise taxes somewhal, (5) to tntnsfcr many of the societal costs such as 
"'rehabili tat ive costs" to businesses, or (6) to implement somc or a ll of these st rateg ies to some 
extent. This last scenario is the most likely. It should be noted, however, that all of these inCre:\Sl-d 
costs to tax payers and state governments cnn be IIvoided by simply nOI lega lizing gambling 
act ivities. 
273. To utilize these formulas. take the numbers from columns one, twO, three, or four and 
multiply by the numbers in column six (or column seven) to estimnte the lotal costs in a particular 
"cost category." Of course, all of these numbers will be modifi ed as new dalU becomes available, 
but they IIrc predicted to increase in the future. 1ne most conservative and frequen tly utilized COSt 
of a compulsive gambler is $52.000 per year. 
214 . Obviously, to calculate these CO~ l s for any city. county, or other population. substitute 
those census numbers for the state IXlpulation. For population numbers. see THE WORLD ALMANAC 
(199]). It shou ld be nOled that in legalil.crl gambling stales, 10% of the public are already spend ing 
approximately $1000 per person per year on state IOIlCTICS. See gelleralfy CLoTFELTER & COOK. 
supra notc 58. 
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Table 3 (continued) 
CQlumn 5 
Cost Category 
Lost Consumer Dollars'l8O 
Lost Work Productiv ity281 
White-Collar Crime C051S282 
lntennediate Incarceration Costs283 
Subtotals 
Long-Tenn Imprisonment C0515285 
Rehabilitative Costs'286 
Debt Accumulalion2ln 
Other Socio-economic Costs288 
Commonplace Crime Costs289 

















215. Su u.s. COMfol'NON GAMBLING. supm nOle lCH. 
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Column 7 















276. Once gambling is legalized, the number of compuJs1\'C gamblers doubles within one to 
five years because of the accessibi lity and acceptability or gambling. Accordingly, the "minimum 
doobling rule" provides that all of the costs associatcd with compulsive gambling will increase by 
3t least 100% once gambling is legalized. BETTER Gov'T ASS'N, supra note 3, at 2. Pursuant to the 
field research, the "findings suggest th:at the introduction of widespread legal gambling, including 
pu lltabs, casinos :and video IOllery terminals, was assodalcd with II 1% increase in the prevalence 
rale of problem and probable p:athological gambling over a 2-ye3f period." Leuer from Volherg [0 
Kindt. supra note 17 1, at 2. This observation was made of the adult problem and probable 
patnological gamblers. This type of increase and the prevaJen~ rates seem (0 be somewhat morc 
intense among [he teenage popul8lion, and, therefore. it would be conservati ve (0 cxtrapolate the 
adult prevalence rates into the teenage population to get theoretical rates reflecting all of the 
population (except chi ldren). Su infra note 217. 
Once more long-term fie ld data becomes avai lable, a fonnula for projecting the future number 
of compulsive gamblers might he: 
I ....... 
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Of course, NG would be the projected growth in the number of compulsive gamblers. The number 
of compulsive gamblers in the initial period would be No. Taking the baseline 1975 prevalence 
rate of .0077 multiplied by the population (or morc precisely, the adull population of an area in 
1975) would give thc No- The exponent is represented by e and time in years is represented by t. 
The rate of growth of compulsive gambling is represented by m, which might be zero (or some low 
number) before gambling is legalized in a state (or in a particular population base) and some 
positive number thereafter. Letter from Economics Professor Jane Leuthold, University of Illinois, 
to Professor John Warren Kindt. University of Illinois (Feb. 25, 1993) (copy on file with the author) 
[hereinafter Letter from Leuthold to Kindt]. 
The previous equation may be placed in linear form by taking the logarithms of the equation 
and placing it in estimalion form as follows: 
InNG", lnNo+mt 
/d. at 1. Because more extensive field research must be conducted to calculate m. the more precise 
numbers await future research resull$. The 1975 baseline prevalence rates, however, are quile well-
established and the recent prevalence rates can be and have been accurately calculated. lbc rate of 
growth in compulsive gambling may await future research, but the increase in the numbers of 
compu lsivc gamblcn, once gambling is legalized, is well-established. 
For analyses of thc social and cconomic aspects of compulsive gambling, see IiENRY R. 
Lr:StEUR, REPORT ON PATHOLOOtCAL GAMBLING IN NEW JERSEY, (1988): Robert M. Politzer et al., 
Report on the Cosf-BenejirlE!fectiveness of Treatment at the Joltm Hopkins Center for Pathological 
Gambling, I 1. GAMBLING BEHAY. 131 (1985): I. Sommers, Pathological Gambling: ESfimmitlg 
Prevalence and Group Chnracteristics, 231NT'L J. ADDICTIONS 477 (1988); Rachel Volberg, Esti-
mating the Prevalencc of Pathological Gambling in the United States (1992); Rachel Volberg & 
Henry J. Steadman, Refining Prevalence Estimales of Pathological Gambling, 145 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 502 (1988); Rachel Volbcrg & Henry J. Steadman, Problem Gambling in Iowa 
(research study funded by Nat'llnst. Mental Health & Iowa Dep't Human Servo 1989); Rachel 
Volberg & Randall M. Steufen, Gambling and Problem Gambling in South Dakota (1991). 
277. As of 1993, the majority of experts were cstimating that 1.5% to 5% of the populations 
of legalized gambling states and/or state locales were complllsive gamblers. Accordingly. to 
project this figure into the next five to twenty years is extremely conservative-particularly because 
tile next generation, the teenage population, is already evidencing gambling addiction rates of 4% to 
15% of the teenage population. See, e.g .. BETTER GOY'T ASS'N, supra note 3, at 30, Dr. Durand 
Jacobs of tile Loma Linda University Medical School has reported a more widely-accepted range of 
4% 10 6% of the teenage population evidencing gambling addiction. See Jacobs, supra note 96, 
For prevalencc I"dtes among the adult population, see Letter from Volberg to Kindt, supra note 3, 
Tablc: ''Comparison of Lifctimc Prcvalcnce Rates of Problcm and Pathological Gamblers by State" 
(reporting 13 studies with a range of 1.5% to 6.3%). The compulsive gambling percentages parallel 
percentages in a 1992 Gallup poll. NEWS SERvICE 12-16-92, supra notc 96, at 1-3. The pereentagc 
of the population admitting that "gambling caused family problems" was 5%, the perccntage who 
enjoyed gambling "a lot" was 7%. and the percentage admitting they gambled "too much" was 
10%. lJ. 
278. This 2% applies to states with widespread legalized gambling, such as statc lotteries. 
There is academic deb.1te about the degree 10 which state lotteries contribute to this problcm. 
Without state lotteries the problem would be less. There is little doubt, however, thai states will 
reach these numbers much more quickly once they legalize the "harder" fonns of gambling such as 
riverboat gambling, casino gambling, and video-machine gambling (i.e., the "crack-cocaine" of 
compulsivc gamblers), 
279. "A veragc" compulsive gamblers consist of those compulsivc gamblcrs "who are at the 
beginning stages of thcir gambling addiction:' BETTER GOV'T ASS'N, supra notc 3, at 15 (quoting 
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Robert M. Poli tzer CI al.. R~port 011 the Societal Cost of Pallw/ogieat Gambling arId Ille Cos/-
Benefit/Effectiveness o/Tremmenl, prtunttd 01 THE FlFIli NAT'LCONFf..RENCE ON GAM BUNG AND 
RlSK TAKING. III 8·[0 (1981». By comparison, Ihc larger social costs are renecte<l in those 
compulsive gamblers who arc in thc Illler stages of gambling addiction and have "oonomed-oUl." 
Id. (citing Politzcr el al .• supra, lit 9.10); see also GAMBLING AODlcnON IN MARYLAND, supra nOle 
65, at 59-61. It should be floted that virtually all of these estimates arc based on male subjects as 
recorded in GAMBUNG ADDICTION IN M .... RYLAND. When adjusted for inflation as of 1992, the 
S52,000 per year cost for each compulsive 81lmbler increases to $53,000 per year. BETTU. GOV'T 
ASS'N REPORT. supra note 3. 3t 14. 
These cost estimates can also be \'iewed in a long~r t~rm analysis. The marginal costs of 
legalizing gambling aaivities can eltend years (and even generations) into the future. A standard 
costlbendit analysis could projcctthese costs into the future, and an appropriate d iscount rate could 
be used 10 sum the discounted values of the costs a~ociated with legalizing gambling. Letter from 
Leuthold to Kindt, supra note 276. at 1-2. The following formula might be used: 
In this formula, C constitutes the present value of discounted future costs. 'The C, would consist of 
the annual projected cost in YClir I, while the rate of discount is represenu:d by r. Id. £It 2; see 
generally CLOTFEl.TER & COOK. supra note 58. 
280. "Lost consumer dollars" equate with the sociological concept of "abused dollars" and 
are defined as "Ie\stimates of the average annual amount obtained legally andlor illegally by the 
IUthological gambler which otherwise would have been used by the JXlthological gambler, his 
family. or his victims for other essential purposes:' BETIH! Gov'T AsS'N, supra note 3. at 15 
(quOllng Politler ct £II., supra nOle 279, at 9). "These abused dollars in<:ludc earned income put at 
nsk 10 gambling, borrowed and/or illegally obtained dollars spent on basic needs andlor provided to 
the family which otherwise would have been used for gambling. and borrowed andlor illegally 
obtained dol lars fo r the partial payment of gambli ng related debts. Id at 15 (quoting Politzer et £II., 
mpr" note 279, at 9). 
For purposes of this tablc, "Iosl consumer dollars'· arc the equivalent of "consumer dollars lost 
traditional business sales·' (which is also the equivalent of ··gambllng dollars gained by gambling 
organillltions"). The "lost consumer dollars" figure includes S 15,000 per year in lost liquid assets. 
281. "Lost work produ'"tivity" equates to the sociolog1cal concept of "lost productivi ty" and 
is defined as "{clstimates of percent oftimc nOI engaged in the production of goods am! services for 
which the individual was employed, multiplied by the avcrage gross annual salary:' Jd. at 8 
(quoting Polil1.er et £II.. supra nOle 279, at 8). Characteristic problems of the compulsiw gamblcr 
include "inattention to work ... DSM-III, sl/pm note 68, at 324. 
For purposes of this table, " lost work productivity'· includes only direct losses to businesses. 
282. "White-collar crime costs" equate with the sociologic:al concept o f "crime costs" and 
arc defined as "[e]stimates of the average annual law enforcement, adjudication, and detention costs 
for the typical type of 'white collar' crimc committed by pathological gamblers multiplied by the 
a\crnge number of violations of the law per pathological gambler." IlI:.TJ"ER Gov'T ASS'N. sl/pm 
note 3, at 15 (quoting Politzcr et al.. Sllpra note 279, at 8). The compulsive gambler evinces 
··financially motivated illegal aeuvuies to pay for gambling." DSM·IJ(, supra note 68. :11 324. It 
should be noted that the high "regulatory COSts" of administering and monitoring the legalized 
gambling act1vities are not includcd in these formulas, bm these COSIS should be incorporated into 
the o\erall costs. Because of the large number of private security guards Irnditionally associated 
with casino gambling, these "security costs" might also be factored 1010 future modifications of 
th~se cost estimatcs. Private SCC1Jrity guards ill"QUnd casinos gcnerally tend to mo\'e some types of 
criminal activities away from casino areas. 
For purposes of this table, "white-collar crime com" include costs due to forgcry, check 
forgery, embelllement. employee theft, tax evasion, tax fraud. and insurance fraud. Thesc 
I 
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subcategories are uYoe<i because they correlate with the crimes most frequently commined by 
compulsive gamblers. See Lesieur, Economic Costs, supra note 66, Table 2. at 21; see generally 
Lesieur & Puig, supra nOle 90. 
283. "Intermediate incarceration costs" equate with the sociological ICon "incarceration 
costs" and arc defined as "\clstim:ltcs of the average confinement costs for a typical crime 
committed by putho]ogical gamblers multiplied by the average number of such crimes committed 
per pathological gambler." BElTER GOV'T ASS'N, supra notc 3, at 15 (quoting Politzer et al.. supra 
note 279. at 9), These costs would be higher. but courts tend 10 divert compulsive gamblers to 
treatment programs and/or require restitution. Since successfully completing the treatment program 
and/or making restitution often results in "clearing the record" of the compulsive gambler, it is 
quite difficuilto calculate some of the costs in this area. However, it should be noted that there is a 
high recidivist mte among compulsive gamblers. 
284. The most coflservative and frequently utilil:ed co~t of a compul~ive gambler is $52,000 
per year. 
285. "Long-term imprisonment costs" are defined as the long-teno costs of incarcerating a 
compulsive gambler per year. These costs are $25,000 per year for young prisoners, bul due to the 
increased medical costs and other factors, these costs climb to $50,000 per year for elderly 
prisoners. Lorenz interview, supra note 108. Since 13% to 15% of all compulsive gamblers are 
incarcerated long-teno, the lotal costs as a function of "all compulsive gamblers" would be $3,750 
per year for younger prisoners and $7,500 per year for elderly prisoners. Id. These costs may 
somewhat overlap the category of "incarcerated costs," although the incarceration costs might be 
more appropriately considcred to be predominantly short-term or intcrmediate incarceration costs. 
See :mpra note 283. 
286. ·'Rehabilitative costs" arc defined as the costs of making the compulsive gambler 
"whole again." Thcsc costs vary from estimates of $5.000 to $20,000 total costs for out-patient 
treatment to costs of $ 17,000 to $42.000 per month for in-patient treatment. 
287. GAMDUNG ADDICTION IN MARYLAND, supra note 65. at 60-61 (calculating a range of 
$72,000 to $83.000 with a weighted average indebtedness of $75.000). "Average gambling debt of 
callers to the New Jersey Compulsive Gambling Hotline: $41,848:' U.s. NEWS & WORLD REP .• 
Mar. 25, 1991. at 12. "It is of interest to note that, as a rule of thumb. when a compulsive gambler 
state the amount of debt he/she has due to gambling, an accurate figure is arrived at by multiplying 
by 3." Lettcr from Elizabeth Georgc, Executive Director. Minnesota Council on Compulsive 
Gambling, Inc., to Professor John Warren Kindt, University of Illinois, (December 21. 1992). 
Other experts believe that a multiplier of "2" is more accurate. Compulsive gamblers havc 
characteristic problems which "include extensive indebtedness and consequent default on debts and 
other financial responsibilities." DSM-IJI, supra note 68, at 324. 
288. For purposcs of this table, "other socio-economic costs" include costs due to child 
abuse, child neglect, and spousal abuse. 
It should be notcd that aftcr casino gambling came to Lawrence County. South Dakota, the 
State AHorney's Office reported an increase of 42% 10 43% in the number of child abuse cases 
during less than 2 years. Speech by Jeffry Bloomberg. supra note 144; see also supra notes 157· 
170 and accompanying text. By definition. compulsive gamblers evince "disrupted family 
relationships." DSM-III, SU1)rtI note 68. at 324. A 1982 study of members in Gam-Anon. whieh 
constitutes the family organization which parallels Gamblers Anonymous, reponed that with regard 
to spouses of compulsive gamblers. "[eJmotional, verbal, and physical abuse was noted in 43% of 
all cases." Valerie Lorenz & Duane E. Shuttleswonh, Tire Impact of Pathological Gambling on tire 
~i)Quse of the Gambler. 11 J. COMMUNITY PsYCHOL. 67, 69 (1983). "In about 10% of Ihe cases the 
children were being physically abused by the gambler:' Id. '"Significant behavioral or adjustment 
problems" were experienced by 25% of the chi Idren. Id. 
A dollar value of the socia-economic costs uf spousal abuse has not yet been calculated. 
Preliminary data indicatc th~l 15% of the wives of compulsive gamblers are "battered" or 
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physically abused. In various samples, 43% to 50% of the cases involving spouses of compulsive 
gamblers repor1ed physical, verbal. or emotional abuse. /d. 
289. For purposes of this table, "commonplace crime costs" include larceny, burghuy, 
armed robbery. pimping. prostitution, selling drugs. and fencing stolen goods. These subcategories 
are used because ttley correlate with the crimes most frequently committed by compulsive 
gamblers. See Lesieur. Economic Costs, supm note 66, Table 2, at 21: see gelternlly Lesieur & 
Puig, ,mpra note 90. 
290. For purposes of this table, "gambling system crime costs" include costs due to 
bookmaking, working illegal games. hustling at pool or olher sport, hustling at cards or dice, 
running a "con game," swindling "suckers," and other criminal fraud. These subcatcgOlics are used 
because they correlate with the crimes most frequently committed by CQmpulsille gamblers. See 
Lesieur. Economic Costs. JlljJm note 66. Table 2, at 2 I; see generally Lesieur & Puig. supra note 
9<1 
